Šta je najbitnije što se u istoriji dogodilo na današnji dan?

[Prospero]

The Myth of German Money during the First World War 

Author(s): Alfred Erich Senn

Source: Soviet Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Jan., 1976), pp. 83-90

Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

 

 

BY definition, political emigres have chosen to leave their native land, and they have continued to struggle, from abroad, against the established authority at home. Under such circumstances, they have always attracted the attention of police agents and the suspicions of loyalists. The pre-revolutionary Russian emigres represented no exception in this regard. The authorities considered them capable-and therefore guilty-of almost any sort of skulduggery and treason to the Empire. It is my purpose here to examine one controversial example of such suspicions-the question of collusion between Lenin and the Germans between the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 and his return to Russia in April 19I7.

 

There exists a sizable body of literature on the topic. The Soviet writers who deign to mention it usually content themselves with reference to an article published in 1960 by Andrew Rothstein entitled 'Out of the Swamp of English-American Ostforschung'.¹ This, of course, has no relevance to the literature of the last 15 years, but Soviet scholars persist in citing it.

 

In my own work, The Russian Revolution in Switzerland, I did not deal with the subject directly because of my own negative conclusions; I dealt with it only in certain aspects as it related to the discussion of one or another personality. For this I drew the complaint of one reviewer that I had not consulted George Katkov's work and that I had failed to consider the significance of Carl Vital Moor.² This article may constitute my response: while Lenin inevitably came into contact with German agents, he knowingly had no provable operating connections with the German mission in Bern or with other German agents before March 1917. To prove this negative conclusion, it is necessary to examine the activities of the major German agents in Switzerland with whom Lenin's name has been linked.  

 

The first to enter the controversy over German money was Gregory Alexinsky, who, in February I915, lectured in Switzerland about the support which the Germans and the Austrians were giving to Ukrainian and Georgian revolutionaries. A 'defencist', Alexinsky concluded that the minority nationalities of tsarist Russia were particularly susceptible to such intrigues, and in an article published in April 19I5 he attacked Alexander Parvus-Helphand for his support of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine'. He also took note of Parvus's invocation of Lenin's name as another supporter of national self-determination for the Ukrainians.³

 

Essentially correct in his analysis of the work of Parvus and the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine, Alexinsky proceeded to cast his net wider and wider, insinuating that many leading emigres were either dupes or agents of the Germans. The polemics among the emigres heated up quickly, but Alexinsky felt ever more justified. As he wrote to one friend: 'I have greatly hindered their provocational activity, for which they and their friends now slander me as best they can.'⁴ Alexinsky continued to accumulate evidence, both spurious and real, to support his views.

 

Lenin's decision to return to Russia through Germany in I9I7 only served further to convince Alexinsky, a former Bolshevik who had opposed Lenin for some years, that the hand of the Germans reached far. In the summer of 1917 Alexinsky cooperated with Albert Thomas in the latter's campaign to expose German-Bolshevik connections.⁵

 

In 1923 Alexinsky summarized his views, asserting that Leon Trotsky had been an Austrian agent; that Karl Radek and Christian Rakovsky had served as 'acolytes' for Parvus; and that Lenin, Nikolai Bukharin, and Gregory Zinoviev had cooperated with Parvus in Switzerland. Alexinsky also printed a document reputedly from the archives of the Okhrana, reporting that Lenin had stayed overnight at the German embassy in Bern, 28-29 December I9I6.⁶

 

Alexinsky's charges had their impact in the 1920S and I930s. Vladimir Burtsev, the 'Sherlock Holmes of the revolutionary movement', agreed entirely; Pavel Milyukov and Alexander Kerensky tended to accept them.⁷ S. P. Mel'gunov, however, viewed the evidence more critically and chose to concentrate his attention on the period after the February revolution.⁸ In I948 David Shub ascribed sinister significance to Lenin's contacts with German agents, but he nevertheless offered only vague and indefinite substance.⁹

 

In the 1950s, when the German Foreign Ministry archives were opened for Western use, Z. A. B. Zeman and Werner Hahlweg published documents concerning German efforts to bring revolution to Russia.¹⁰ The analysts now dug more deeply. Zeman noted: 'There is no evidence among the documents of the Foreign Ministry that Lenin, a circumspect man, was in direct contact with any of the official German agencies.¹¹Instead, there now developed a picture of go-betweens: Alexander Keskiila, Parvus-Helphard, Alexander Tsivin, and perhaps Carl Moor. 

 

Each of these men, except Tsivin, subsequently attracted his own chronicler. Zeman combined with Wilfred Scharlau to describe Parvus's career; Michael Futrell found Keskiila still alive in Spain and recorded his role in the 'northern underground'; and Leonhard Haas collected an enormous amount of informatio on Moor's life.¹² As later efforts to synthesize these materials, there are the works of Stefan Possony and George Katkov.^l3 We also have two intriguing efforts to popularize the issues: Alan Moorehead's study published in 1958 and Michael Pearson's synthesis published in I974.¹⁴

 

These works, in so far as they deal with the emigration before the February revolution, still lack the final convincing connection to implicate Lenin with the Germans. That Tsivin, Parvus, Keskiila, and Moor worked as German agents of one sort or another, is not to be denied; they certainly gave the Germans information about various emigres, including Lenin. Yet there is no evidence that they transmitted anything from the Germans to Lenin.

 

Parvus is probably the best known, and his relationship with Lenin seems clear. Scharlau and Zeman have produced an interesting biography, and have concluded that there was indeed no cooperation between the two. It is clear, they declared, that 'Lenin refused the German offer of aid'.¹⁵Myths, however, die hard, and other writers, while admitting that the evidence shows no agreement between Parvus and Lenin, nevertheless go on to draw contrary conclusions. Possony, indeed, has argued that Parvus turned down Lenin's proposals.¹⁶

 

In 1958, Moorehead, using Possony's materials, wrote: 'Yet some sort of an understanding was reached between the two men, and almost certainly money was involved.'¹⁷ More recently, Pearson wrote: 'In their meeting in his rooms in Distelweg, Lenin clearly rejected the proposal that Parvus put to him, but almost certainly there were other areas of agreement.'¹⁸

 

It is intriguing, I might add, how many authors attempt to demonstrate their expertise by insisting that Parvus met Lenin at the lattet's apartment on Distelweg in Bern. The two men met in May I915, while Lenin and Krupskaya had, in fact, moved from Distelweg in the middle of April. Their pious landlady there had objected to the cremation of the body of Krupskaya's mother, who had died in March.¹⁹

 

As corroborating evidence of Zeman and Scharlau's conclusion that Lenin's refusal to help Parvus forced the latter to concentrate his efforts on Scandinavia, I would cite Parvus's bank account with the Swiss Kreditanstalt, which showed that he paid out a total of only 25,600 Swiss francs in the period between his arrival in Switzerland in May I9I5 and the February revolution of I917.²⁰ Parvus simply did little in Switzerland.

 

Another figure who can be easily disposed of is Alexander Tsivin. Because Zeman favoured him with the publication of a long document on his activities,²¹ historians have felt in duty bound to discuss him, although other figures, such as the Ukrainian Wladimir Stepankowsky, deserve considerably more attention.²²

 

Tsivin was a Socialist Revolutionary who came to the German ambassador in Bern, Baron Gisbert von Romberg, with the endorsement of the Austrian Military attache. George Katkov referred to Tsivin as one of Romberg's 'major informers on the Russian revolutionary movement', but then noted that he was 'about to be dropped by his employers when the February Revolution occurred'.²³ Romberg's records showed that after Tsivin had received some 100,000 francs in the winter of I916-17 the Auswartiges Amt cut off his pay on the grounds that he had failed to produce anything really worthwhile. To be sure, Romberg resumed payments after the February revolution, but Tsivin's record failed to improve. Tsivin was, in fact, an expensive failure, and there is no evidence to connect him with Lenin. Nevertheless, we can find insinuations that such a connection existed.²⁴

 

A more significant name in the problem of German money has been that of Alexander Keskiila, an Estonian who had at one time belonged to the Bolshevik party. A student in Switzerland since 1911, he contacted Romberg shortly after the outbreak of the war, and sold the ambassador on the idea of stirring up revolution among the nationalities of tsarist Russia. This was always his first concern: the fate of Estonia and the other nationalities of tsarist Russia. He made clear to Romberg that he expected 'no help for the nationalities' from the Russian socialists. Nevertheless, largely on the basis of Futrell's work, some historians have accepted the view that Keskiila represented some sort of link between Romberg and Lenin. To be sure, Keskiila set up his own network of agents and collaborators, and this network included contacts within the Bolshevik party, but Keskiila exerted no visible influence on Lenin, nor did he provide Romberg with any systematic information about the Bolsheviks.²⁵

 

Keskiila's man in Lenin's organization was Artur Zifeldt (Siefeld), also an Estonian, who joined the Bolshevik party in Zurich only in 1915. Lenin relied on him for certain contacts with Italians, although Zifeldt spoke no Italian.²⁶ Zifeldt described himself as 'a historian, an archaeologist, I study the history of the Ancient East and comparative mythology'. He wrote a number of historical studies, but, by his own admission, 'the greater part of them lie "on my shelves" '. He had published only a few items on Estonian mythology and philology. In particular, in 19I4 and 19I5 he was seeking publishers for his history of the alphabet and his study of 'Adam and Eve'. Experts, he claimed, predicted a 'shining future' for him; in the meantime he complained of living in 'terrible want'.²⁷

 

Under the circumstances he probably went to work for Keskiila with enthusiasm, and he most likely joined the Bolsheviks at Keskiila's direction. Even so, we find that he attempted to extend his activities  beyond just Bolshevik circles. In November 1915 he offered his services to the Russian librarian N. A. Rubakin as a writer of popular books on the history of culture. He could also type or proof-read printed materials. Zifeldt also told Rubakin that, if hired, he would prefer to remain in Zurich, 'with which I am connected by IooI threads'.²⁸ Lenin, it might be noted, was living in Bern at this time.

 

A position in Rubakin's library would have brought with it wide contacts among the Russian revolutionaries in Switzerland, but Rubakin refused to hire him. Although Zifeldt presumably informed Keskiila of Lenin's activities, his correspondence with Rubakin would indicate that watching Lenin was not enough of a job for him; he was seeking a greater area of activity.

 

For all of Keskiila's exorbitant claims of having 'discovered' Lenin, the evidence in the German archives is sparse. The major document consists of a report, written by Romberg in September I915, announcing that Keskiila 'had succeeded in discovering the conditions on which the Russian revolutionaries would be prepared to conclude peace with us in the event of the revolution being successful'.²⁹ These so-called 'conditions' prove upon examination to be only a summary of an article which Lenin then published in Sotsial-demokrat on 13 October I9I5. Zifeldt had presumably provided Keskiila with the material, but the document hardly deserved the top secret handling which the Germans gave it.

 

In summary, Keskiila seems to have been a master of name-dropping. He used his acquaintance with Lenin to impress Romberg, and in Scandinavia he used Lenin's name to penetrate the Bolshevik organizations there.³⁰ His actual contact with Lenin was minimal. Besides the celebrated report of September I915 he gave the Germans relatively little of substance on the Bolshevik leader, and he certainly did not deliver any significant sums to the Bolshevik coffers.³¹

 

Another figure for us to consider, albeit briefly, is Carl Moor, the veteran Swiss Social Democrat. While Moor knew many political emigres, and he aided them in various ways, he apparently became a German agent only in April 1917, after Lenin's departure from Switzerland.³² Therefore, he obviously could not have served as a link between Lenin and Romberg.

 

We have considerably more grounds for suspicion in considering the activities of Jacob Fiirstenburg-Hanecki, a Polish supporter of Lenin who also worked for Parvus in Scandinavia. Polish and Soviet historians insist that Hanecki's relationship to Parvus was strictly one of business. Dubious as this may seem, we have no hard and fast evidence to the contrary in the period before the February revolution. Hanecki's possible role in the transmission of German money in the summer of I917 is another question, but one which goes beyond the bounds of this article.³³

 

A last intriguing figure to mention here is Bentsion Dolin, a political emigre who was in the service of the Okhrana and who became a double agent by working with the Germans during the First World War. Since he on occasion used the cover name 'Lenin', historians have occasionally been terribly confused in their reading of documents. This is almost certainly at the heart of Possony's assertions that members of the German embassy in Bern remembered 'Lenin's' visiting the embassy,³⁴and I suspect that this is the underlying misconception in Alexinsky's Okhrana report purporting to record a visit by 'Lenin' to the embassy in December I916. Apart from the confusion caused by his pseudonym, however, Dolin should play no part in this picture because his prime loyalty seems clearly to have been on the side of the Okhrana.³⁵

 

One must yet note that the Austrians indirectly aided Lenin in the first months of the war through their support of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine,³⁶ just as the Germans, through Parvus, gave money to the Russian emigre newspapers in Paris, Golos and Nashe slovo. From the beginning of I915, however, as the sources of this funding became more clear and more widely understood-and here Alexinsky played no small role-Lenin and the emigres in Paris rejected such support. In the words of Harold Shukman: 'Funds were plainly not flowing into Lenin's hands.'³⁷

 

The question of whether German money was coming to Lenin and the Bolsheviks has, in fact, three or perhaps four phases: the period of the war while Lenin was in Switzerland; Lenin's return to Russia through Germany; Bolshevik finances in the summer and autumn of I917; and German-Bolshevik relations after the October revolution. I have dealt here with only the first phase. 

 

As for the second phase, I have found no evidence of any secret agreement between Lenin and the Germans concerning the terms of his return to Russia in April I917. Lenin aroused the antagonism of his peers not so much by his decision to cross Germany as by his decision to break the united front which the emigres were attempting to present and to travel alone, without awaiting approval from Petrograd.³⁸ The question of German support of the Bolsheviks in the summer and autumn of I917 is beyond the purview of this study and requires investigating the activities of a different set of personalities in a totally different context.

 

In conclusion, one has to be struck by the 'Watergate' mentality which hangs over the question of German money both before and after the February revolution. There are those who pursue the problem enthusiastically as if thereby hoping to make the Bolshevik revolution disappear; others seem to fear the question for perhaps the same reason. Some say that it is settled, all the necessary facts are known. In; reviewing the work of Scharlau and Zemanr, Leo van Rossum warned strongly against interpreting great social revolutions in conspiratorial terms.³⁹ Whether the Bolsheviks took German money or not, the October revolution remains a historical fact which must be dealt with in relationship to an epoch, not as a conspiracy.

 

 

University of Wisconsin, Madison 

 

 

 

 

 

1 Andrew Rothstein, 'Aus der Sumpf der englisch-amerikanischen Ostrorschung', Jahrbuch fiir Geschichte der UdSSR und der volksdemokratischen Ldnder Europas, vol. 4 (1960), pp. 345-70. 

2 Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 50 (1972), p. 477.

3 'O provokatsii'. Sovremennyi mir, 1915, no. 3, pp. 50-63; 'Avstriiskie provokatory i rossiiskie putanniki', ibid., 1915, no. 6, pp. 145-69; Russia and the Great War (London, 1915). 

4 Letter to N. A. Rubakin, undated, Moscow, Lenin Library, fond 358, 199/I9. 

5 On Thomas's activity, see 'Dossier "F"' in his personal papers (microfilm, Paris). 

6 See his Du tsarisme au communisme (Paris, I923), pp. 23-3I. 

7 Cf. Alexander Kerensky, Crucifixion of Liberty (New York, 1934), pp. 313-32, and his Russia and History's Turning Point (New York, 1965), pp. 304-I0. 

8 S. P. Mel'gunov, 'Zolotoi nemetskii klyuch' k bol'shevistskoi revolyutsii (Paris, I940). 

9 David Shub, Lenin (New York, I948), pp. I36-7, I80-3. 

10 Z. A. B. Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia I915-I918 (London, 1958);. Werner Hahlweg, Lenins Riickkehr nach Russland 1917 (Leiden, 1957). 

11 Zeman, op. cit., p. x. 

12 Michael Futrell, Northern Underground (London, I963); Z. A. B. Zeman and Wilfred Scharlau, Merchant of Revolution (London, 1964), and Scharlau and Zeman, Freibeuter der Revolution (Cologne, I964); Leonhard Haas, Carl Vital Moor. Ein Leben fiur Marx und Lenin (Zurich, I970). 

13 George Katkov, Russia 1917: The February Revolution (New York, 1967); Stefan T. Possony, Lenin: The Compulsive Revolutionary (Chicago, I964). 

14 Alan Moorehead, The Russian Revolution (New York, I957); Michael Pearson, The Sealed Train (New York, I974). See also Nicholaus Fritz Platten, 'Von der Spiegelgasse in den Kreml', published serially in Volksrecht (Zurich), 13 March I967 to 17 April 1967, and reprinted as 'Iz zerkal'nogo pereulka v Kreml' ', in Grani, no. 77 (1970), pp. 102-33, and no. 79 (I97I), pp. I58-20I. 

15 Scharlau and Zeman, Freibeuter der Revolution, p. 179. 

16 Possony, op. cit., p. I8o. 

17 Moorehead, op. cit., p. 122. 

18 Pearson, op. cit., p. 6I. 

19 A. S. Kudryavtsev et al., Lenin v Berne i Tsyurikhe (M., I972), pp. 59-6I. 20 Bern, Bundesarchiv, Landesgeneralstreik. 21 Zeman, Germany and the Revolution .... pp. 18-23. 

22 See Jerry H. Hoffman, 'V. Stepankovsky, Ukrainian Nationalist and German Agent', Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 50, pp. 594-602; Alfred Erich Senn, Diplomacy and Revolution (Notre Dame, 1974), pp. 120-I. 

23 George Katkov, 'German Political Intervention in Russia', in Richard Pipes (ed.), Revolutionary Russia (New York, 1969), pp. 96-97.

24 Katkov, Russia, 1917 ... , pp. 83-84. 

25 Using information provided by Possony, Moorehead wrote of Lenin's receiving money directly from Keskiila, but no one else has made such a claim (Moorehead, op. cit., p. I26). 

26 See V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, vol. 49, p. I65; Futrell, op. cit., pp. 145-6; Alfred Erich Senn, The Russian Revolution in Switzerland, I914-.9I7 (Madison, 197I), pp. 6I-62. 

27 Correspondence with N. A. Rubakin, February-March 19I4, Moscow, Lenin Library, fond 358, 230/41.

28 Letter of 20 November I915, ibid. 

29 Text in Zeman, Germany and the Revolution ..., pp. 6-8. 

30 See A. Shlyapnikov, Kanun semnadtsatogo goda (2 vols., M., I923), vol. I, pp. 204-5; vol. 2, pp. 00oo-2; Futrell, op. cit., p. 121. 

31 Willi Gautschi, Lenin als Emigrant in der Schweiz (Zurich, 1973), pp. I64-76, sees the connection between Lenin and Keskiila as somewhat more significant, but he still views Lenin as the object of Keskila's activity rather than as an associate. Futrell, op. cit., p. I48, tempered his enthusiasm for Keskiila by saying: 'All that can be said is that Keskiila's contributions must have helped to keep Lenin's organization going in 1915-I916', but then on p. 157 he added: 'When Keskiila says, as he does, "Lenin was my protege . . . It was I who launched Lenin," his statement does not entirely lack foundation.' 

32 Haas, op. cit., p. 169. 

33 For a biography of Hanecki, see Z pola walki, I962, no. 2(i8), pp. 171-95. 

34 Cf. Possony, op. cit., pp. I83, 192. 

35 V. A. Agafonov, Zagranichnaya okhranka (Petrograd, I918), pp. I28, I77-82, 335-40. 

36 Senn, The Russian Revolution .. ., p. 55. 

37 Harold Shukman, Lenin and the Russian Revolution (New York, 1966), p. I68.

38 See Alfred Erich Senn, 'New Documents on Lenin's Departure from Switzerland, 91I7', International Reviezv of Social History, vol. 19 (1974), pp. 245-76. 

39 Leo van Rossum, 'A propos d'une biographie de Parvus', Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique, vol. 8 (I967), pp. 244-63.

[Prospero]

Semion Lyandres

The Bolshevik "German Gold' Revisited - An Inquiry into the 19I7 Accusatrons

 

1995 by The Center for Russian and East European Studies,

a program of the University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh

 

 

pp. 101-104:

 

O Muru i Haneckom, iz zaključka:

 

 

 

 

 

By the end of April, an uninterrupted exchange of telegraphic communications concerning party activity had been established between Fürstenberg-Hanecki, on the one hand, and Lenin, Zinoviev, Kollontai and Kozlowski, on the other. At the same time, Fürstenberg continued exchanging business-related telegrams with his associates, most notably Kozlowski and Sumenson. It appears from these telegrams that the spring of l9l7 brought increased delays in both the delivery of imports to Russia and the return of payments for them to Stockholm. This, coupled with the sharp fall of the rouble on the Scandinavian market had a disastrous effect on the trading company's profits. Worowski, and after him Fürstenberg, traveled to Russia to acquaint themselves with the situation first-hand, and try to get the business back on its feet. (On those same occasions they met with Lenin to discuss Party matters.)

 

The trips, however, did not yield the desired results. In the middle of June, soon after his return to Stockholm, Fürstenberg began considering another journey to Russia. By this time, however, it was too risþ. Petrograd Counterintelligence had already begun shadowing Sumenson, and the right-wing Menshevik newspaper Den' had accused Fürstenberg-Hanecki of cooperating with German agents. Sumenson was consequently able to talk her employer out of making a second ttip.ta After this, the business's chances for survival decreased even more. At the end ofJune, Fürstenberg wired Sumenson to suspend trade operations and transfer abroad all remaining money from her accounts. Some she did manage to transfer, while others were allegedly confiscated by authorities after her arrest. 

 

When at the height of the July Uprising the Ministry of Justice obtained a full set of telegraphic communications between Petrograd and Scandinavia, it was confronted by a rather confusing picture. The telegrams were an odd mixture, some dealing with political issues, others concerned with monetary transactions, with references to Bolshevik leaders in both types. Some telegrams simultaneously addressed party and financial matters. Sorting through all this conflicting and often misleading information would have required time and a great deal of motivation, both of which the authorities seemed to have lacked. As a result, the Ministry of Justice hastily accused the Bolshevik leaders of receiving German money through Parvus' business, and claimed that the telegrams were a cover for the transactions. These accusations, as the present work has demonstrated, were never substantiated'

 

This conclusion does not necessarily eliminate the possibility that Parvus may have supplied funds to the Bolsheviks by different channels. There is some probability, for instance, that funds reached the Bolsheviks through Parvus' intelligence agents. In 1915, after the Germans put at his disposal the first million rubles to promote revolution Russia, Parvus set up a special organization in Copenhagen, which operated concurrent to both his Institute for the Study of the Social Consequences of the War" and his import-export business. The organization had its network of agents who maintained contact with and apparently provided financial assistance to different revolutionary groups in Russia. Another important function of these agents was to keep Pannrs informed about political and economic conditions in Russia. Parvus evidently considered their information more reliable than that coming from the Bolshevik underground. After all, his agents were free from allegiances to any parties. Parvus' famous 1915 memorandum to the German Chancellor (he blueprint of his Revolutionierungspolitik) was written, for example, on the basis of secret reports-from one of his most confidential agents, the Warsaw meshchanin Vladislav L. Shatenstein. Shortly after the February Revolution, Shatenstein was sent again on a secret mission to Russia. Among other things, he would send information back to Copenhagen about the political situation in Petrograd, which Parvus would then share with a representative of the German intelligence network. This may also indicate that Parvus used Shatenstein and other agents to finånce the Bolsheviks, although so far no direct evidence has emerged to confirm such a supposition.

 

Of course, this is not to say that the Bolsheviks did not receive financial assistance from the German government. The documents of the German Foreign Ministry indicate that substantial funds were allocated to support Bolshevik anti-war activities in 1917. But since the present research disproves the generally accepted view of how the assistance reached the Bolshevik organization (that is, through Fürstenberg-Kozlowski-Sumenson's business), it appears more likely that the Germans used other intermediaries than the banking system. There is documentation of at least one occasion on which a significant sum of money was delivered to the Bolsheviks through other channels. In August 1917, Carl Moor, the Swiss socialist and agent of the German (and before that, Austrian) government, approached the members of the Bolshevik Foreign Bureau in Stockholm with an offer of financial support to the party. Nikolai A. Semashko, the future People's Commissar of Public Health, who at the time was on his way back from emigration, reported the proposal to Petrograd. Party leaders immediately took it up for discussion and, according to the published Minutes of the Central Committee, officially declined the offer. The recorded decision, however, did not entirely reflect what had actually taken place. Recently declassifÏed records of the Central Committee reveal that in summer 1917 the Bolshevik Foreign Bureau in fact did receive from Moor a contribution in an amount then valued at 230,000 German marks. Moor, it is worth adding, was working independently of Parvus.

 

At the same time, the new information also reveals that this money never reached the Bolshevik organization in Petrograd. Instead, it was used by the Foreign Bureau to fÏnance the so-called Third Zimmerwald Conference of anti-war socialists (including German!), which met in Stockholm in September 1917. Thus far, this is the only documented proof that the Bolsheviks received German funds before coming to power.

 

By way of conclusion it should be noted that the present reassessment of the July l9l7 accusations does not limit itself to demonstrating that the' Provisional Government's case lacked validity. It represents the first major step towards the reinterpretation of the entiie issue of German support to the Bolsheviks, thus bringing a new focus to the much-debated issue of foreign involvement in the Russian Revolution. Another and potentially more important implication of this study is that it raises previously unposed questions about the functioning of the Provisional Government, its justice appafatus, and its members' notions of legality' Exploration of these and other related issues promises new insights into largely overlooked realms of Russian legal, administrative and law-enforcement practices during the crucial period between the Tsarist and Bolshevik regimes'

Edited March 18, 2016 by Prospero

[Prospero]

Mrzi me da tražim nešto novije, ovo je bilo pri ruci.

[Korki]

Нема потребе да те мрзи, та оправдања су позната још од радова Троцког.

Елем,

 

Written: Written on March 31 (April 13), 1917
Published: Published in Russian in part on April 5 (18), 1917 in the newspapers Dyen No. 25 and Rech No. 78. Published on April 14, 1917 in the newspaper Politiken No. 85. Printed from the Politiken text. Translated from the Swedish.
Source: Lenin Collected Works, Progress Publishers, 1977, Moscow, Volume 41, pages 397-398.1.
Translated: Yuri Sdobnikov
Transcription\Markup: R. Cymbala
Copyleft: V. I. Lenin Internet Archive (www.marxists.org) © 2004 Permission is granted to copy and/or distribute this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License.

The Russian revolutionaries who arrived in Stockholm on Friday morning handed to Politiken for publication the following official communiqué concerning their trip:

Britain, which officially welcomed the Russian revolution with “joy in her heart”, at once did everything to nullify one of the results of the revolution—the political amnesty. The British Government does not allow transit to Russia for Russian revolutionaries who live abroad and who oppose the war. When this had been proved beyond doubt—this fact has been confirmed by numerous documents which will be made public in the very near future, and Russian socialists of all trends have stated as much in a unanimous resolution—a section of the Russian Party comrades decided to try to return from Switzerland to Russia via Germany and Sweden. Fritz Platten, Secretary of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party and the leader of its Left wing, a well-known internationalist and anti-militarist, conducted negotiations with the German Government. For their trip the Russian Party comrades demanded the right of extraterritoriality (no inspection of passports or luggage; no officials allowed into their car). The group of those who travelled could include anyone, regardless of political views, provided the Russians themselves approved of his candidature. The Russian Party comrades declared that in return they would demand the release of Austrian and German civilians interned in Russia.

The German Government accepted the terms, and 30 Russian Party comrades, men and women, left Gottmadingen on April 9, including Lenin and Zinoviev, editors of Sotsial-Demokrat, the Central Organ of Russian Social-Democracy; Mikha Tskhakaya, editor of Nachalo^{2} in Paris and a founder of the Caucasian Social-Democratic organisation, who had earlier brought Chkheidze into the party, and also several members of the Jewish Workers’ Union. Fritz Platten was in charge of the trip and he alone conducted all the necessary negotiations with the representatives of the German Government who accompanied the train.

During the three-day crossing of Germany, the Russian Party comrades did not leave their car. The agreement was strictly honoured by the German authorities. On the 12th instant, the Russians arrived in Sweden.

Before their departure from Switzerland, a record was made of all the preparations for the trip. Having studied this document, Henri Guilbeaux, representing the French Social-Democratic group “Vie Ouvrière” and editor of Demain^{3} a leader of the radical French opposition in Paris, whose name cannot now be divulged^{4}; Paul Hartstein, a member of the radical German opposition; M. Bronski, representing Russian-Polish Social-Democracy, and Fritz Platten signed a statement voicing their full approval of the way in which the Russian Party comrades had acted.

 

https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/mar/31b.htm

 

Иначе ту де су стигли у Шведској је био штек немачке обавештајне службе кроз "левичаре" да изазову хаос у Русији неколико година пре. Неколко покушаја великих штрајкова у Русији је покушано одатле још 1915. са великим немачким новчаним залеђем.

 

 

Consequently, Germany wanted “the highest possible amount of chaos” in Russia, according to its Foreign Minister, Arthur Zimmermann. “It is in our interests that the influence of the radical wing of the Russian revolutionaries should prevail,” he wrote.

Both Lenin and the Germans wanted the same thing; and, via the Swiss Social Democrat Fritz Platten, a deal – extraordinary in both its grand intentions and its tiny details – was carefully brokered: the sealed train.

[Prospero]

lol

 

 

Boljševici nisu hteli haos nego revoluciju i priliku da izgrađuju komunizam, haos je dobrim delom postojao i pre Okt revolucije i pre njihovog većeg angažmana tokom leta, a haos je bio sredstvo za postizanje revolucionarnih ciljeva.

 

Za Nemce je haos u protivničkim redovima bio sam po sebi cilj.

 

 

To što zoveš "opravdanjima" nisu opravdanja nego sintetički rezultati obimnih i raznoraznih istraživanja, a zoveš ih tako pošto ne odgovaraju tvom pamfletarnom pristupu u odbrani prizemnog i rigidnog etatističkog pogleda na sopstvenu istoriju koji je (barem po medijskoj eksponiranosti) dominantan u Rusiji danas.

 

Ništa novo nisi rekao niti si na bilo koji način osporio ma i jednu rečenicu iz gore okačenih.

Edited March 18, 2016 by Prospero

[Korki]

A History of the First World War in 100 Moments: Sealed and delivered - Russia’s most feared revolutionary returns

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/world-history/history-of-the-first-world-war-in-100-moments/a-history-of-the-first-world-war-in-100-moments-sealed-and-delivered-russia-s-most-feared-9502097.html

[Prospero]

Fantastičan (a po pisaniju trivijalan) prikaz nečega što uopšte nije osporavano, a što ne dokazuje ništa drugo osim samo sebe, da je Lenjin došao u Rusiju preko nemačke terirorije i sa kajzerovim Alles Gute! pozdravom.

 

 

Dakle imamo ostvarenu transakciju od nemačkih agenata ka boljševicima od 230k maraka koja je primljena u Štokholmu i utrošena za organizaciju Trećeg (cimervaldskog) kongresa u Štokholmu u septembru 1917.

 

Ostale pare su otišle na klasično plaćanje špijuna, što je toliko redovna stvar da je irelevantna.

Edited March 18, 2016 by Prospero

[Korki]

Под контролом немачке владе да направи хаос у Русији.

[Korki]

Иначе је занимљиво како је Британија одобравал устанак у фебруару(што се види и горе), док год њихови мишеви, бајаги либерали, воде Русију и да гину за њих као против Наполеона. Верујем да онај напредак Руса у Турској према Босфору 1916 није имао улогу у томе, иако су им као обећавали то пре рата. Били су јако забирнути за демократске слободе у сред рата зато су обарали цара.

Али и њима се то вратило кроз деколонизацију где је СССР имао водећу улогу, па су сада нико и ништа.

[Prospero]

Под контролом немачке владе да направи хаос у Русији.

Ako ponoviš još 650 puta opet neće biti smislenije nego prvi put.

 

korelacija =/= kauzalitet

poklapanje kratkoročnih interesa =/= rad po tuđem nalogu za tuđi interes

cilj =/= sredstvo

 

 

5.10. je bio CIA-in puč da obori Miloševića, ergo svi učesnici 5.10. su bili de facto CIA-ini agenti na terenu i ništa drugo osim toga

Edited March 18, 2016 by Prospero

[Prospero]

Što se tiče Trockog, kad smo se dotakli "ubačenih elemenata" stvar je daleko složenija ali izgleda i još bezveznija:

 

Interrupted journey: British intelligence and the arrest of Leon Trotskii, April 1917
Richard B. Spence
Revolutionary Russia, 13:1, 1-28
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546540008575715

On the morning of 3 April 1917, the Norwegian liner SS Kristianiafjord lay at anchor in the harbour of Halifax, Nova Scotia. The vessel had left New York a week before and now waited in the Canadian port for clearance from British naval authorities for the Atlantic crossing. The ship had gone through the routine many times before, but on this occasion special considerations held up departure. Among the Kristianiafjord's passengers were numerous Russian subjects hurrying home in wake of the Tsar's fall. One particular party of Russians had attracted the attention of His Majesty's authorities. At 10 a.m. an armed party from HMS Devonshire led by Lt. M. Jones, RNVR, came aboard
the Norwegian vessel where they arrested and removed six Russian travellers. The most notable of these men was Leon (Lev) Davidovich Trotskii.1 Accused of being dangerous revolutionaries and German agents, the future Soviet leader and his companions would remain in British/Canadian custody for almost a month before resuming the homeward journey.

...

Although brief, Trotskii's recollections of his return to Russia note two important steps taken before he left New York.3 First, he visited the Russian consulate where, after some initial difficulty, he received an entry permit in accordance with the general political amnesty decreed by the new Provisional Government.4 Next, he stopped at the British consulate where an official of the Military Control Office vised his passport and assured him that the British Government would place no obstacles in his way.5 The latter action was essential because British authorities scrutinised the travel of all persons bound for Europe, particularly neutral Scandinavia and Russia, and could prevent or seriously obstruct such travel if they so desired.6 Trotskii knew the Kristianiafjord would undergo inspection in Halifax before proceeding to Bergen, but with his papers in order there seemed no reason for further concern. Trotskii's version of events is generally accurate, so far as it goes. Biographers have followed his view of the episode with little or no elaboration.7

In the years since, however, this seemingly simple tale has been embroidered many times for various purposes, mostly partisan. On the right, Trotskii's arrest has been cited as proof that he (and more broadly all Russian revolutionaries) was, variously or simultaneously, the tool of Germany, Jewish conspirators, and international bankers. Among the accusations are that he left New York with a boatload of revolutionary comrades, carried an American passport provided by Woodrow Wilson and $10,000 courtesy of the German-American Jewish financier Jacob Schiff.8

The above accusations might be termed the 'German Libel'. Among the earliest such pieces to appear, was a 1919 article by Canadian Lt. Col. John B. McClean, 'Why Did We Let Trotzky Go?' Among other things, McClean asserted that Trotskii/Bronshtein was a German, not a Russian, a long-time agent of the Kaiser's secret service and was returning to Russia flush with German funds to destroy the new government.9
McClean claimed to have been privy to confidential British and American documents on the case, though the general inaccuracy of his claims suggests otherwise. The accusation that Trotskii was the agent of a Jewish conspiracy backed by Schiff and others appeared in a report to US military intelligence as early as the fall of 1918.10

That information, however, emanated from a former tsarist prosecutor and Okhrana agent, Boris Brazol, who was a virulent anti-Semite. More recently, Antony Sutton's Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution weaves the above charges into a new conspiracy with Trotskii as the agent of 'international capitalism', an indictment that could be appreciated by Stalinists as well." The left has been more restrained in its approach, largely accepting Trotskii's account as the final word and defending him as a victim of English imperialism. An early example is a 1918 article in The Call (New York) which strenuously denied any German connection, citing a 'secret' US government report as 'proof'.12 The article does admit Trotskii's close friendship with Ludwig Lore, editor of the New York based German-socialist Volkszeitung, a key link in Trotskii's supposed 'German Connection'. It also includes numerous details about his return journey, though the number and names of his travelling companions bears little similarity to those given in official records.13 However ludicrous many of the above charges may appear prima facie, they are widely promoted to this day, as a casual search of the internet will show.14

...

The seizure of Trotskii and his companions was initiated on 29 March by a coded telegram from the Naval Intelligence Division (NID) of the British Admiralty to the British naval control officer in Halifax, Capt. O.M. Makins. A copy also went to the local fortress intelligence officer, Capt. A.R. MacCleave. It read as follows:
101. Following are on board KRISTIANIAFJORD and should be
taken off retained pending instruction. TROTSKY VOSKOFF
GLADNOWSKI MUCHIN and others. These are Russian
socialists leaving for purpose of starting revolution against
present Russian Government for which TROTSKY is reported to
have 10,000 dollars subscribed by Socialists and Germans.15

The message contains the gist of the 'German Libel' noted above - Trotskii was in possession of German or German- sponsored funds and was returning to Russia as part of a conspiracy to overthrow the pro Allied regime. This shows that such accusations existed at the time of his arrest and were not invented after the fact. As we shall see, however, only two of the names mentioned, Trotskii's and Muchin's, matched passengers on the Kristianiafjord, suggesting the original source was not terribly well-informed. On the morning of the 30th Capt. Makins conducted an initial inspection of the ship's passengers and noted the 'presence of many Russian socialists on board'.16 

 

Of these, a group of six men, including Trotskii, were pegged by Makins to be the subjects indicated in the telegram. Kristianiafjord's departure was delayed, but Makins took no immediate action to arrest the subjects or remove them from the ship. Cabling the names to London, Makins and MacCleave awaited further instructions. New orders in reply did little more than repeat the initial information, and in response Capt. Makins again visited Kristianiafjord on 1 April and re-examined all Russian passengers. He reported that Trotskii and his five companions in 2nd Class 'are evidently the band referred to'. They were, he noted, 'all avowed Socialists', and though professing a desire to help the new Russian government, 'might well be in league with German Socialists in America and quite likely a hindrance to the Govt. in Russia just at present'. How he arrived at these conclusions he does not say. In any case, Makins proposed to remove the six suspects from the vessel on the 3rd and 'hand them over to the Military Authorities for internment pending further instructions'.

...

There is nothing in the extant reports mentioning any member of the party in possession of an American passport, $10,000 or any other large sum of money. It does not seem probable that the British authorities would have overlooked these, especially the money. The matter of money is significant, because writers such as Sutton charge that Trotskii could not have afforded passage home on his meagre income, thus necessitating some outside source of funds. The Call records that Trotskii received a weekly wage of $20 from Novyi Mir and $10-$15 for editorials written for other publications, including the Volkszeitung. Another source records that he gave at least 35 public lectures at $10 each.33 Altogether such work could have yielded some $700 by the time of his departure.34 Payne mentions that a farewell banquet took up a collection of an additional $128.35 Assuming frugal living, Trotskii could have afforded the $300 for his and his family member's passages plus other travel expenses.36 However, The Call (sympathetic to Trotskii) claims that he paid for 17 tickets totalling $1,394.50, something seemingly beyond his personal means. 

...

Who issued the orders that led to Trotskii's arrest? Trotskii seems to have suspected that the new Foreign Minister of the Russian Provisional Government, Pavel Miliukov was somehow behind the matter.39 The conservative Miliukov had attacked Trotskii's radicalism in the past, and Trotskii's recent criticism of the new regime might have revived this antipathy. However, upon learning of events at Halifax on 4 April, Miliukov demanded the immediate release of the  detainees.40 His reasoning, as later explained by British Ambassador Sir George Buchanan, was that the incident could create an 'embarrassing situation' for the new government that might exploited by 'socialist extremists'. Buchanan offered that there were so many extreme socialists in Russia already that 'a few more can hardly make a difference'. Thus, the Russian government preferred that British authorities permit the Halifax detainees to proceed.4

As noted above, the order for the arrest of Trotskii and his companions came from the Naval Intelligence Division headed by Admiral Reginald 'Blinker' Hall. The Admiral was an experienced intelligence chief and the documentation shows that he took a strong personal interest in the Trotskii case. When pressed by the Foreign  Office to explain his action, on 4 April Hall stated that Trotskii and the other Russians had been arrested because information from New York indicated that the former was the leader of a movement to start a revolution against the present Russian government with funds provided by socialists and Germans. Thus, he added, 'It is proposed to detain them for the present, but if discreet inquiry shows that the Russian Government wishes to let them in, arrangements could be made for sending them on'.42 The Foreign Office forwarded Hall's note to Buchanan on 5 April, adding that 'this may have a salutary effect on Mr. Miliukov and Mr. Kerensky'.4

On 10 April, however, Hall took a stronger stand, though with little more information to offer. 'Information was recently received from New York', he told the Foreign Office, 'that an important movement had been started among socialists there, financed by Jewish (and, possibly, ultimately German) funds, with the object of securing the return to Russia of revolutionary socialists who would overthrow the present Russian Government'. The same source revealed that Trotskii was the ringleader of this movement and had voiced his intentions at a meeting held 20 March, "various Germans', concluded Hall, bid farewell to Trotskii and supplied him with $10,000 to finance his seditious activities.44

Later that day, the Foreign Office informed Buchanan that Hall had instructed authorities at Halifax to hold the Trotskii party until further notice. In addition, a note drafted by Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour ordering the release of the Trotskii party was cancelled.45 The Admiral was said to be preparing a report summarizing 'what he already knew about these men' which could be forwarded to Buchanan and the Russian government.46 This promise proved sufficient for Miliukov to retract his demand that the detained Russians be let go. Later still the same day, Buchanan cabled London that after consultation with Aleksandr Kerenskii (the minister of justice), Miliukov requested that the release of the Halifax detainees be postponed until His Majesty's Government provided further details as to the reasons for their arrest.47

Who then was Hall's source of information in New York? According to Arthur Willert that someone was Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Sir William George Eden Wiseman. The latter was chief of the British Secret I ntelligence Service (SIS, otherwise known as Mile, later MI6) in the United States.48 Headquartered at 44 Whitehall in lower Manhattan, Wiseman's intelligence and propaganda activities were masked by purchasing duties for the Ministry of Munitions. As a member of Wiseman's propaganda section, Willert was in a position to know something about what went on. Writing in the early 1950s, he declared that 'the Canadians, warned by Wiseman, picked [Trotskii] off the ship'.49 However, Willert's erroneous involvement of the Canadians suggests he was working with inaccurate or incomplete information— or being deliberately deceptive. Wiseman's biographer WB. Fowler more cautiously suggests that Trotskii's arrest occurred 'possibly on a tip from Wiseman'.

In his secret service duties Sir William was assisted by two other British officers, Capt. (later Major) Norman Graham Thwaites and Robert (later Sir Robert) Nathan. Nathan focused on Indian sedition but also took a keen interest in Bolshevik' affairs.51 Thwaites not only worked under Wiseman in 'Mile, Section V, but also oversaw the Military Control Office and its passport duties. He co-operated as was necessary with Hall's NID and the British counter-espionage agency MI5, but relations among the agencies were vague and rife with conflict and even competition.52 In effect, the Mile branch viewed itself as a wholly autonomous organisation answerable only to 'C (SIS chief Mansfield Smith-Cumming) in London.

...

Under the aegis of Mile Section V, Wiseman oversaw a highly secret network of agents - and double-agents - who reported directly to him or via Thwaites or Nathan. Other British officials were strictly out of the loop; Wiseman's secret service activities were independent from all other British intelligence gathering and on occasion, it seems, at cross purposes to them.56 Wiseman's informants kept him abreast of matters involving German sponsored sabotage as well as aid to seditionists of various stripes.57 In this context, Section V was very interested in the affairs of the Russian Supply Mission in New York, a body thought to be infested with German and revolutionary sympathisers. Rather than correct the situation, Wiseman seems to have preferred to exploit it to his own advantage.58 In Russian matters a key figure utilised by Wiseman was Sidney George Reilly (Salomon Gershkevich Rozenblium), sometimes dubbed the Ace-of-Spies'. The Russian-born Reilly's long career of political and financial intrigue is too complicated even to summarise here.59

A resident of St. Petersburg for most of the decade before WWI, he acquired broad and intimate connections to Russian business, intelligence and political circles, including the tsarist secret police (Okhrana) and military intelligence. From his office at 120 Broadway, Reilly operated as a freelance Russian military contractor (some called him a grafter) and exercised 'tremendous influence with the members of the Russian Mission'.60 Reilly was on intimate terms with the officials of the local Russian consulate, the very ones who, however reluctantly, granted Trotskii his entry visa.61 Behind the scenes, Reilly traded Russian secrets to win the confidence of the Germans and, in turn, betrayed them to Mile.62
Where his true loyalties, if any, lay is an open question

...

Thus, Section V had excellent sources of information about Russian and Russo-German intrigues. Wiseman, moreover, took a keen interest in Russian affairs in the immediate wake of the February Revolution. As early as April he established contact with the Russian general staff and secret police sources (probably via Reilly) in an effort to collect information.74

In light of all this, it seems impossible that he would have overlooked Trotskii's departure on the Kristianiafjord. So, Wiseman was the ideal source for Hall's information. Except for one thing - he was not. Admiral Hall identified his New York source as the British Naval Attache, Commander Guy Gaunt.75 Prior to the arrival of Wiseman in late 1915, Gaunt had functioned as the defacto British intelligence chief in the USA, a position he seems to have relished. But Gaunt was Hall's man only, and as Wiseman built up Mile, he slowly co-opted Gaunt's funds, duties and agents.77 Gaunt's later declaration that he was 'Chief of the British Intelligence Service in the United States, 1914-1918', was false as he certainly knew. Likewise his rather catty assertion that 'Wiseman played a very small part under me' suggests a certain sensitivity on the subject.78 Even the man that Gaunt praised as his reliable No.2, Norman Thwaites, really worked for Wiseman.79

...

In March 1917 Gaunt must have been on the lookout for some fresh means to undercut the upstart Wiseman, and Trotskii's departure may have provided that opportunity. Gaunt's tiny office still received reports of general information such as the granting of travel permits by the MCO and, likely, reports such as Inspector Tunney's. If nothing else, Trotskii's 'escape' could be used as evidence of Wiseman's gross mishandling of affairs. However, Gaunt may have suspected that the Trotskii case was more than a simple oversight; that Wiseman had let him pass deliberately. That, if true, hinted at collusion. Trotskii, Gaunt might have reasoned, could be a key to Wiseman's dubious activities. Significantly, at almost the same time - probably the same day - that Gaunt informed NID of Trotskii's nefarious affiliations, he was saying much the same about Wiseman's key informant Reilly. In a report that found its way to the American Bureau of Investigation (precursor to the FBI), Gaunt blasted Reilly as a Russian Jew with German connections and 'an enemy of the Allies'.84 

In 1916, Gaunt had received information from Russian sources in New York that an officer attached to the Russian mission, Col. VA. Nekrasov, was in German pay. The charges emanated from the offices of Russkii golos, an anti-tsarist but 'non-party' paper that had taken a special interest in exposing skulduggery within the Russian missions. Gaunt pressed for an investigation which was taken up by Thwaites. The latter declined to speak with the Russians who made the accusation and instead turned to none other than Reilly and Weinstein who gave Nekrasov 'a clean bill of health' despite ample evidence of malfeasance.

 

...

 

It was through Kuznetsov that Reilly and Weinstein were linked to yet another figure, the Russian-American lawyer Nicholas Alienikoff. The latter was their attorney and front man in several business deals, some of which appeared to have German connections.92  Alienikoff had emigrated to America in 1881 and pursued a successful career as a commercial lawyer in New York. At one point he was 'attorney for the Russian consulate under the old regime', but by WWI he was a man of strongly anti-Romanov sentiments, an 'idealist' and close, as he admitted, to many revolutionary emigres.93

...

Trotskii also claimed that officials in Halifax and Amherst prevented him and his comrades from communicating with the Russian government, but this does not seem to have been quite the case.96 On 4 April, the day following their arrival at Amherst camp, the Russian consul in Montreal, I.A. Likachev, received a telegram from the six detainees describing their predicament and demanding 'your immediate intervention to protect ... interests of Russian citizens and dignity of government which you represent'.97 Likachev at once cabled Petrograd with the news and fired off inquiries to Canadian officials, including Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Sir Joseph Pope. The latter responded that an 'immediate investigation' would be made, though, as he soon discovered, the matter was out of his hands.98

More important in spreading word of the incident was a letter from Chudnovskii to comrades at Novyi mir. This missive arrived in New York on 9 or 10 April and at once created a stir. A telegram went to Russia Justice Minister Aleksandr Kerenskii invoking his aid and word spread swiftly through Manhattan's emigre and radical communities. One person who got the word right away was Nicholas Alienikoff. On 10 April he sent a cable to R.M. Coulter, Deputy Postmaster General of Canada, requesting intercession on behalf of the Russian exiles interned at Amherst.99 Four days later, Alienikoff sent a follow-up letter to Coulter in which he confessed to knowing Trotskii, Chudnovskii and Mel'nichanskii 'intimately'. He characterised these men as revolutionary patriots and 'true sons of Russia' who should be released at once so they might 'contribute their share in the great task of reconstruction and regeneration of the Russian nation'.100 There was no way, he asserted, that they could be agents of Germany. Their arrest, he argued, was an unfortunate mistake no doubt precipitated by 'malicious' reports concocted by 'supporters of the old autocracy'.101 

Alienikoff's involvement in Trotskii's case could be explained by his general interest in revolutionary affairs. However, as with other persons in this saga, Alienikoff was not quite what he seemed. Postmaster Coulter recalled that he met Alienikoff 'in connection with Departmental action on United States papers in the Russian language'.102 In other words, Alienikoff was an informant to Canadian postal authorities with regard to Russian publications in the US, among them, no doubt, Novyi mir. Similar matters were handled by Section V in New York, so it is a fair assumption that Alienikoff had at least indirect connection to Wiseman's outfit, a notion further supported by his affiliation with the Reilly-Weinstein clique.103 Wiseman could not interfere in the matter without tipping his hand, nor could Reilly or Weinstein given that they also were under suspicion. Alienikoff, however, was detached enough to make inquiries and press for the detainees' release without compromising others.

...

Wiseman's opinion regarding Trotskii and his arrest is conspicuous in its absence. As the SIS station chief, one would expect him to have something to say, particularly as it related to matters in which he had authority and acute concern. Nor does it seem probable that his superiors would have failed to inquire as to how Trotskii slipped through passport control. Thwaites also was curiously reticent on the matter. In December 1917 he did remind Canadian military intelligence that 'As you may be aware, Trotskii was able to sail from this country via Halifax without molestation ... it is important that no other such troublemakers be allowed to reach Petrograd', suggesting that the whole thing was the fault of the Canadians.106  The likely answer to this silence is that in such matters Wiseman and his lieutenants reported directly to SIS chief Cumming.107 Whatever they had to say about Trotskii, if it survives at all, must rest in the still-sequestered files of MI6.

...

Assuming that Wiseman, one way or another, aided Trotskii's return to Russia, what could have led him to believe that this would favour British/Allied interests? Trotskii, after all, was an outspoken opponent of the war and all governments waging it. However, Wiseman's attention may have been drawn to a statement made by Trotskii soon after the fall of the Tsar. Interviewed at the Novyi mir offices, he expressed reservations about the new regime and opined that it would soon give way to 'men who would be more able to carry forward the democratization of Russia'. He reiterated that the true  desire of Russian revolutionists was an end to the war, but he added that if they had it in their power, revolutionary forces 'would not make a separate peace with Germany'.109  

 

It was the prospect of a Russian defection from the Allied cause, not revolution, that worried Wiseman and his superiors in London.110 Wiseman believed he could do something to prevent that occurrence. In the immediate wake of the Revolution, he hatched a plan to mount  a propaganda campaign from America aimed at influencing political currents in Russia. He hoped to counter German influence and 'guide the storm' by supporting the 'more responsible elements', including those on the revolutionary left, perhaps especially those.111 In this he may have been guided by Reilly's belief that the political contest in Russia was among rival variants of socialism, not revolution versus reaction. By mid-April Wiseman acknowledged contact with 'anarchist revolutionary socialists' in New York and was encouraging them, with financial incentive, to write comrades in Russia and lobby against pacifist, defeatist tendencies.112 

 

An overriding concern was that this support be kept secret; the British hand was not to be visible in any respect. Trotskii was anti-war, but not a defeatist; not pro-Ally, but neither pro-German, and he was opposed to the most immediate danger, a separate peace.113 This clearly separated him from the likes of Lenin who was indeed backed by the Germans.114 Given his strong influence in revolutionary circles, Trotskii would have been an ideal asset for Wiseman's scheme. If Wiseman did not try to recruit him, he certainly should have.

...

In terms of money, there were several ways that Wiseman could have funnelled funds to Trotskii, with or without the latter's knowledge. One means was through intermediaries such as Alienikoff or other co-operative socialists. Among the latter may have been Ludwig Lore, editor of the Volkszeitung. Although the paper supposedly was the recipient of German funds, Lore's strident opposition to the Wilhelmiam regime and its imperialist programme (he blamed the Kaiser for starting the war) was along the lines of material that Wiseman sought to encourage.116 Thus, was Trotsky's work for Volkszeitung indirectly subsidised by British funds?

...

For large sums, say $10,000, Wiseman would have had to turn elsewhere. Here it is worth recalling the supposed financial connection between Trotskii and Jacob Schiff, head of the banking house of Kuhn & Loeb. As it happened, Schiff and Wiseman had formed a close bond in 1917. Schiff was a long-time supporter of anti-tsarist activities.121 As the sponsor of the 'Society of Friends of Russian Freedom', he had underwritten revolutionary efforts for years.122 More to the point, at the same time Wiseman was enlisting revolutionary socialists in his propaganda plan, he recruited Schiff for the same venture.123 The latter was to use his influence with Russian bankers and Jewish activists, but he no doubt was willing to put some dollars at Wiseman's disposal, money that conveniently could not be traced to a British source.124 Might this be the grain of truth in the misnamed 'German libel': Schiff did channel money to Trotskii, but at the behest of British, not German, agents? 

 

Assuming that Wiseman did place a bet on Trotskii, presumably with the tacit support of certain persons in London, it would seem to have proved a bad one.125 In any case, helping Trotskii back to Russia was nothing anyone would want to take credit for and reason enough not to discuss it later. Even so, it might be well to reconsider briefly Trotskii's behaviour over the next year. He certainly helped topple the Kerenskii regime (no great loss to the Allied cause), but as Bolshevik peace negotiator he effectively scuttled the talks at Brest-Litovsk and provoked the Germans into resuming hostilities. He opposed the subsequent settlement pushed by Lenin, and declared his willingness to renew war against the Central Powers if suitable arrangements could be made with the Entente camp. In this regard he met regularly with British representative Bruce Lockhart and more quietly abetted the activities of Mi1C agents such as George Hill - and Sidney Reilly.

...

But what of Trotskii and companions' captivity in Amherst; how was their freedom finally achieved? By mid-April, pressure for Trotskii's release mounted. In addition to Alienikoff's letter, one or two others,136 and the Fraina-sponsored rally, on 16 April the British Embassy in Washington received a telegram from the 'Russian Colony of Pittsburgh' which protested the 'suppressing over the citizens of Russia and [we] request of their immediate release'.137 However, the
cause did not have the whole-hearted support of the Russian emigre community. Around the offices of Russkii golos, the suspicion prevailed that Trotskii was a 'German spy and provocateur', and persons linked to the paper claimed to have proof of this, though such was not produced.138 Or was it just ignored?

...

Meanwhile, in London Russian Charge d'Affaires Konstantin Nabokov sent a memo to the Foreign Office on the 16th asking for any new information concerning the Halifax detainees he might report to his government. He noted again that Trotskii and the others carried valid  Russian passports and that Petrograd was bound to accept their return under the terms of the general amnesty.142 Pressure, indeed, yet nothing overwhelming. Nevertheless wheels somewhere  started to turn.
On 21 April, Makins cabled Ottawa that the following had been received from the Admiralty late the previous afternoon: 'Russian Socialists should be allowed to proceed'.143 There was no further explanation. 

 

...

 

The Amherst Internment Station weekly report for the week ending 5 May 1917, lists only five men 'taken to Halifax under escort to be placed on steamer bound for Petrograd'.

...

Indeed, the examination of the episode  raises as many questions as it resolves. We have found that while thereis no real evidence to support allegations of Trotskii as a German tool, there is diverse, albeit circumstantial, material to suggest a link between him and the British Mi1C operation in New York. It seems likely that he was targeted as part of Wiseman's ambitious scheme to influence political developments in Russia. As a result, he appears to have been a temporary victim of the rivalry between Wiseman and Gaunt. The larger question is whether Trotskii was an unwitting pawn or a willing collaborator. In the latter case, would this have been any different from Lenin's acceptance of German aid, including money, to accomplish his revolutionary ends? Would it make Trotskii any less a revolutionary, or simply a pragmatic and resourceful one? Those are questions for readers to settle in their own minds. Of course, if Trotskii was a willing collaborator, even for the most opportunistic of reasons, the historical implications range far beyond 1917-18. There is a supposed saying in intelligence circles that when it comes to collaboration, one is either a virgin or a whore. If a file somewhere exists, or existed, that could prove such a connection, one can only imagine to what uses it was put. Stalinist charges that Trotskii was an imperialist agent may have had their own germ of truth, however disturbing that may be to contemplate.

 

 

[namenski]

 

Korki vs Prospero 

[vathra]

Кажем ја да је боље сачекати Апостату.

За овакве ствари ипак треба имати искуства у фајту са Крстарице.

[namenski]

Eto vidis sta si uradio!!! 

Sad se ucutali  :(

[Korki]

Треба додати да је тајна царистичка полиција, Охрана, све време знала шта немци раде и успешно је осујетила неколико немачких покушаја прављења хаоса у Русији током Првог светског рата а пре 1917. Охрана се инфилтрирала међу бољшевике као и гомилу остале црвене емиграције, тако су успели да отерају Троцког из Европе током рата до 1917. Штавише, Охрана је тајно подржала бољшевике на изборима за Четврту Думу, таман пред Први св. рат, јер је Лењин био човек који није правио компромисе са другим странкама које су се бориле против цара на левици. Са таквим ставом је стално изазивао сукобе на левици. Па је левица стално патила, примера ради, Бољшевици су на тим изборима добили свега 15 посланика од 448 колико је Дума имала. Најјаче странке су били либералне фракције(Прогресивци, Октобристи и Кадети) и националисти али не екстремно десни, попут Црних стотина(чији су представници имали сличан број гласова као и Бољшевици). Колико су бољшевци добро радили за цара треба видети Другу думу, када је било далеко више левих странака од најмоћније Радничке странке(социјалисти који су били везани за село), Социјал-Револуционара до Мењшевика, 6 пута више посланике него у Четвртој думи, када је ушло само 15 посланика Бољшевика и 10 посланика Радничке странке.

 

 

Проблем је настао јер нису обраћали пажњу на друге људе, који су били блиски наводним савезницима, који су растурили владу а онда и саму Охрану те збацили цара, што су Немци искористили да убаце Лењина у Русију да изазове комлетан колапс државе јер је, између осталог, Охрана била растурена. Једноставно нико није могао ни да сања да ће Британија са симпатијама гледати на обарање цара током рата, у најтежим тренуцима, цара који је спасио западни фронт за Антанту пар месеци раније.

Edited March 19, 2016 by Korki