Drugi svetski rat - opsta istorija

[porucnik vasic]

Gde se dedu budale koje otkrivaju RL podatke anonimusima na netu.

 

 

Можеш да ми доставиш у којој хоћеш форми, јавно, тајно, у шифрама...какогод. Ја се на известан начим бавим овом тематиком иако ми није струка, провео сам неко време по најбољим школама на Источној Обали, па ме занима. Имам пар јако добрих пријатеља Американаца који су докторирали из области на Харварду, Принстону, Јејлу, Станфорду, неке од њихових ментора и лично познајем. Зато не стиди се, гукни или онда могу да извучем закључак да не говориш истину.

[Anduril]

Sto se tice konzistencije: ovo je forum, jbg.

Dakle mesto gde se poprilicno neobavezno razgovara ili svadja, svejedno.

Cak i tako, manjkavo, vrlo brzo se iskonzistenziraju stavovi pojedinaca, ovako ili onako, ovakvi ili onakvi.

Ljudi smo, jbg.

 

A sto se tice nespominjanja pakta iz 1932. a po tebi tendenciozno - ideologizovanog spominjanja onog iz 1934, jedan od razloga mozda moze da bude i ona poprilicno znacajna godina izmedju.

 

Samo forum? Forum? Pa ovo je najgore unizavanje ikada. :)

 

Sto se ove godine izmedju tice, ta moralna argumentacija upravo i poredi Hitlera i Staljina, tj. ako je Poljska mogla sa Hitlerom 1934. zasto ne i Staljin 1939. Poredjenje sa Vajmarskom Nemackom nema tu mnogo smisla. No, mala razlika je tu sto je Hindenburg bio jos uvek ziv a nacisti 34' i 39' su dve razlicite stvari po ucinku.

Meni je taj realpoliticki argument za pre svega defanzivan pakt sa nacistima problematican iz tri glavna razloga:

- doturili su vaznu ekonomsku pomoc u resursima kad je nacistima bilo najpotrebnije usled napada na Francusku i Britaniju

- nisu ocekivali napad pa je svo to "defanzivno" zauzimanje istocne Poljske ionako zavrsilo sa nacistima pred Ljeningradom i Moskvom

- zasto su gubili energiju na zauzimanje Baltika i posebno delova Finske sto je zbog slabosti dokazalo Hitleru da vredi napasti sto pre

Dakle, ako je to bila realpolitika, onda je totalno promasena.

 

Можеш да ми доставиш у којој хоћеш форми, јавно, тајно, у шифрама...какогод. Ја се на известан начим бавим овом тематиком иако ми није струка, провео сам неко време по најбољим школама на Источној Обали, па ме занима. Имам пар јако добрих пријатеља Американаца који су докторирали из области на Харварду, Принстону, Јејлу, Станфорду, неке од њихових ментора и лично познајем. Зато не стиди се, гукни или онда могу да извучем закључак да не говориш истину.

 

Lepo, a ja sam proveo dugo vremena i jos provodim tako da te mogu uputiti samo na prethodni post.

Da li ces ti, anonimus sa neta, meni nesto verovati ili ne mi je u potpunosti svejedno.

[namenski]

Samo forum? Forum? Pa ovo je najgore unizavanje ikada. :)

 

Sto se ove godine izmedju tice, ta moralna argumentacija upravo i poredi Hitlera i Staljina, tj. ako je Poljska mogla sa Hitlerom 1934. zasto ne i Staljin 1939. Poredjenje sa Vajmarskom Nemackom nema tu mnogo smisla. No, mala razlika je tu sto je Hindenburg bio jos uvek ziv a nacisti 34' i 39' su dve razlicite stvari po ucinku.

Boldovano: nacisti su bili nacisti i 1934. i 1939, a istorijska je cinjenica da je SSSR bio jedina drzava koja je pokusavala da kroz institucije kao sto je Liga naroda, na primer, organizuje kakav-takav otpor vise nego vidljivom i predvidljivom nemackom ekspanzionizmu. Antifasizam kao ideoloski - po tebi - element cele stvari namerno ne pominjem.

 

Meni je taj realpoliticki argument za pre svega defanzivan pakt sa nacistima problematican iz tri glavna razloga:

- doturili su vaznu ekonomsku pomoc u resursima kad je nacistima bilo najpotrebnije usled napada na Francusku i Britaniju

- nisu ocekivali napad pa je svo to "defanzivno" zauzimanje istocne Poljske ionako zavrsilo sa nacistima pred Ljeningradom i Moskvom

- zasto su gubili energiju na zauzimanje Baltika i posebno delova Finske sto je zbog slabosti dokazalo Hitleru da vredi napasti sto pre

Dakle, ako je to bila realpolitika, onda je totalno promasena.

 

Realpolitika nije garancija uspesnosti: rekoh ti, ljudi grese, zajebu se.

To sto sama upotreba pojma realpolitika priziva sliku hladnog i nemilosrdnog drzavnika/diplomate/politicara koji ne gresi, bice da je stereotip: imas jedno 100 miliona primera da su se takozvani realpoliticari zestoko i realno zajebali. Realpolitika podrazumeva, shvata se kao ekstremno racionalna i nije redak slucaj da se, suocena sa tako nemerljivim i nepredvidljivim desavanjima kakva su ratovi i revolucije po pravilu zestoko zajebe.

 

Ekonomska pomoc nacistima nije doturana, narocito ne u smislu ciljane pomoci Hitleru ne bi li ovaj sto pre pobedio u ratu: moze o Staljinu/SSSR da se misli sta hoce, hladan i trezven pogled na medjunarodne odnose ne moze da im se porekne.

To sto ti zoves pomoc bila je kristalno cista trgovina u kojoj se i SSSR domogao itekako vaznih materijala, narocito industrijske opreme i onog sto se danas zove transfer tehnologije: gomile sovjetskih tehnickih delegacija i to veoma visokog nivoa (Tupoljev, Jakovljev, da pomenem samo neke svima poznate) su se motale po Nemackoj i bio im je dozvoljen uvid u poprilicno stvari.

Onako, tek da se pomene, sovjetski probni piloti su u Nemackoj isprobali zaplenjene Spitfajere par godina pre nego sto su im isti avioni kao pomoc stigli sa druge strane.

A sto se vajmarske Nemacke tice, danas se retko pominje da je srz nemacke vojne doktrine razradjena i isprobana na poligonima u SSSR - Lipeck je najpoznatiji - na kojima su Nemci zajedno sa Sovjetima isprobavali sve ono sto u Nemackoj nisu smeli zbog odredbi Versajskog ugovora. Trautloft, Galand, Melders, da pomenem samo neke, su se zanatu ucili na sovjetskim poligonima, a Stuka je upravo tamo dobila ausvajs za dalje. Naravno da su i Sovjeti izvukli koristi od toga i naravno da realpoliticki ne mozes zameriti ovim dvema drzavama tadasnjim parijama u takozvanoj medjunarodnoj zajednici ovu vrstu uzajamnog ispomaganja.

Saradnji je ucinio kraj licno Adolf i to odmah po dolasku na vlast.

 

Nemacko - sovjetski medeni mesec od avgusta 1939. do juna 1941. jeste po mnogo cemu kontroverzan, ali tesko da ce se naci iko ko ce da ospori cinjenicu da su obe strane znale itekako dobro da im obracun ne gine, da su ljubavisale drzeci one cuvene fige u dzepu; mislim da u modernoj istoriji, a i sire, ne postoji sporazum cije su prolaznosti i privremenosti obe strane bile toliko svesne.

 

Za zauzimanje/okupaciju Baltika - i Besarabije, BTW - nije bila potrebna neka narocita energija, pa se nije ni gubila.

Finski rat je nesto drugo i tesko da je Hitleru dokazao ili pokazao bilo sta sto ovaj vec nije znao, a sto se tice spremnosti, sposobnosti i opremljenosti RKKA. Opste mesto u memoarima Nemaca koji su se susreli sa Sovjetima u Poljskoj kada su je ono podelili 1939, bila je skoro zapanjenost losom opremom RKKA; ovo je prica koja, uostalom, nije za ovaj topik.

 

Ono sto se po tebi ionako zavrsilo pred Moskvom i Lenjingradom ima i svoju geostratesku dimenziju: moglo je da se zavrsi i iza Moskve i Lenjingrada da nije bilo onih cca 200 kilometara Poljske koji su postali deo SSSR i bili, postali deo puta koji je Nemcima predstojao leta 1941. Sa sovjetske tacke gledista tih dodatnih 200-ak kilometara bili su dobrodosao i zlata vredan dodatak, sve drugo na stranu.

[apostata]

Druze, ajde da zanemarimo da je nemacki napad na Poljsku poceo nedelju dana nakon potpisivanja Molotov-Ribentropp, ajde da zanemarimo da su Sovjeti dve nedelje kasnije napali Poljsku dan nakon sto su se osigurali na dalekom istoku, ajde da zanemarimo to da su nakon napada potpisali sporazum o demarkazciji i prijateljstvu, ajde da zanemarimo to da su Nemci predali SSSRu deo teritorija u Poljskoj u skladu sa "predjasnjim dogovorom", ajde da zanemarimo da su zajedno odrzali pobednicku vojnu paradu cije slike sam ti ostavio ovde, ajde da zanemarimo da su Sovjeti posle dugo pregovarali o pristupanju trojnom paktu. U tajnom delu sporazuma

Ništa od toga ne možemo, ne trebamo i ne smijemo da zanemarimo.

No eto ja opet ne znam kako sve to ide u prilog tvojoj tezi o zajedničkom napadu?

Sve ove činjenice koje si gore naveo naravno stoje, ali ne može se ukupna slika formirati samo na osnovu njih.

 

Ti kažeš

da je nemacki napad na Poljsku poceo nedelju dana nakon potpisivanja Molotov-Ribentropp

 

aludirajući na to da je sa potpisivanje Dogovora ... ključno djelovalo na realizaciju njemačkog napada na Poljsku.

 

Hajmo malo hronologije:

 

-  22. augusta Hitler potpisuje naređenje za napad na Poljsku 26. augusta

 

-  istog dana Ribentrop leti u Moskvu

 

-  23. potpisan je Dogovor ...

 

-  25. V. Britanija sa Poljskom potpisuje dogovor o pomoći

 

-  istog dana naređenje o napadu na Poljsku je povućeno

 

(e a sada zašto je povućeno ako je Hići bio dovoljan za napad samo osiguranje nemješanja SSSR-a)

 

Idemo dalje

 

-   počinje intezivna diplomatska komunikacija

 

-   28. Hitler dobija preko Musolinia poruku od Engleza u kojoj se otprilike kaže da ako se smirenje trenutne krize može naći u povratku Danciga i davanju koridora Njemačkoj, onda je do tog rješenja u razumnom periodu moguće doći bez rata.

 

Za Hitlera je ovo sasvim dovoljno te on:

 

-  28. augusta potpisuje naređenje za napad na Poljsku 1. septembra

ajde da zanemarimo da su Sovjeti dve nedelje kasnije napali Poljsku dan nakon sto su se osigurali na dalekom istoku,

Ta priča bila je završena prije - 26. augusta propao je posljednji pokušaj deblokade Japanaca, a 28. ostavku daje pobornik rata sa Sovjetima Kitiro, sa novim premijerom Abeom (i u narednom periodu) vlast će polako preuzeti morska partija koja će budućnost Japana vidjeti na jugu.

 

Tako da su Sovjeti krivi i za napad na Perl Harbur.

 

ajde da zanemarimo to da su nakon napada potpisali sporazum o demarkazciji i prijateljstvu,

 

Šta tebi tu konkretno smeta - razgraničenje ili prijateljstvo?

ajde da zanemarimo to da su Nemci predali SSSRu deo teritorija u Poljskoj u skladu sa "predjasnjim dogovorom"

Nije tačno.

Po "predjasnjem dogovoru" SSSR-u je trebalo pripasti Varšavski vojvodstvo sa djelom Varšave i Lublinsko vojvodstvo.

ajde da zanemarimo da su zajedno odrzali pobednicku vojnu paradu cije slike sam ti ostavio ovde 

 

Ni ovo nije tačno.

Nikakve parade nije bilo.

 

Po prvorazrednom izvoru  Žurnal borbenih dejstava XIX motorizovanog (Guderijanovog) korpusa, objavljenog u Izdebski J. Wojskowy Przegland Historyczny. 1991. № 3/4. S. 246-251.ceremonija predaje počela  je defileom (Vorbeimarsch) djelova XIX korpusa, kojem je prisustvovao kombrig Krivošein, posade nekoliko sovjetskih tenkova (najvjerovatnije 4) i 8 članova sovjetskog vojnog orkestra.

 

Ceremonija završava spuštanjem njemačke zastave uz sviranje njemačke himne (sviraju Švabe) i podizanjem sovjetske uz izvođenje internacionale (sviraju Sovjeti).

 

Nijemci nakon toga odlaze u Zambrov, a ujedno počinje ulazak sovjetskih trupa u Brest.

ajde da zanemarimo da su Sovjeti posle dugo pregovarali o pristupanju trojnom paktu

 

Šta ba dugo?

 

Prvo, to je bio predlog Hitlera.

 

Drugo, o tome se razgovaralo 2 dana u novembru '40 u Berlinu, zatim 25. nov. u razgovoru između Šulenberga i Molotova, kada je on njemu predao pismo sa uslovima pod kojim bi se SSSR eventualno priključio Trojnom paktu i još jednom 17. jan. u razgovoru opet Molotova i Šulenberga, kada se Molotov interesovao zašto nema odgovora.

 

Treće, Molotov je u nov. došao do Hitlera da bi od njega saznao kakav Njemačka ima odnos prema sovjetskim interesima na Balkanu, moreuzima i Kini i Finskoj. Hitler da bi izbjegao odgovor (da su tu sovjetski interesi u koliziji sa članicama Trojnog pakta) nudi SSSR-u pristup i pravac expanzije prema Afganistanu i Pakistanu.

 

Nakon povratka u dogovoru sa Staljinom Molotov daje Šulenbergu pismo u kojem ulazak u pakt kategorički uslovljava sa uvažavanjem gore pomenutih sovjetskih interesa.

Odgovor je trebao biti indikativan, ali i neodgovaranje je to isto bilo, jer očito je da Njemačka u daljim planovima neće voditi  nikakvog računa o interesima SSSR-a, što je drugim riječima značilo da je na strategijskom planu rat neizbježan.

U tajnom delu sporazuma Nemacke i SSSRa stoji:

 

Ne znam šta si mislio sa ovim?

I što nisi boldovao i ono In the event?

U nekim gradovima su nacisti poceli ofanzivu pa su se posle ulaska Sovjeta povukli i pustili Sovjete da dovrse posao i uzmu grad. Nakon zavrsetka rata u Poljskoj potpisan je vec pomenuti "sporazum o demarkaciji i prijateljstvu" kojim su modifikovane i utvrdjene granice.

Kojim gradovima?

U Ljvovu npr. odmah po završetku borbi Sovjeta i Švaba, poljski garnizon se predao ovim prvim.

Ja ne znam stvarno, nigde ne pise "zajedno cemo vojno napasti Poljsku" ali ako je tebi sve ovo OK vazi, ali meni nije niti ce ikada biti. 

Gledajući iz moralnog rakursa to nije naravno O.K, ali onda se taj rakurs mora striktno primjenjivati na sve, no sa time se istorija ukida kao nauka i pretvara u disciplinu etike.

Pa nemoj da me zezas. Niko ovde ne zamera SSSRu sto nije uletela u rat na strani Poljske vec sto je sa Nemackom podelila Poljsku.Valjda smo apsolvirali da ponasanje Engleske i Francuske nije bilo adekvatno situaciji. One su u tom trenutku bar objavile rat Nemackoj. SSSR je otisao korak dalje i podelio "zone uticaja" sa Nemackom..

Jesi li ovo ti onomad napisao?

 

Nisam video post, ali evo da ti odgovorim na pitanje. Ja bih za svoju zemlju rekao da bi prava stvar bila da se pridruzi borbi protiv nacista tako da ni za SSSR nemam nesto nize standarde cak bi zbog velicine i uticaja trebalo da imam vise ali ajde.

 

 

E ono što ti komentarišeš je bio odgovor na to tvoje.

 

Na kraju je vecina tih teritorija koje je SSSR okupirao posle rata ostala SSSRu

I Viljnuski kraj je ostao LItvaniji, a i Poljska je vaskrsla.

Pobedili jesu, ali uz ogromne zrtve.

 

 "We have won just about enough ground to bury our dead."

Hruscov je napisao: "Ova pobeda je nas moralni poraz". Rat je bio greska. Crevena armija je posle njega izgledala kao grupa amatera za sta je najvise odgovorna Staljinova cistka. Zapadnjaci su jos vise izgledali kao grupa impotentnih slabica koji ne znaju sta hoce. Finska se suocila sa velikim brojem izbeglica iz okupiranih teritorija i naraslo je antirusko raspolozenje koje je dovelo do priblizavanja Nemackoj i sukoba sa SSSRom u kome je SSSR imao jos vece gubitke. 1994. je Jeljcin priznao da je rat bio greska i agresija.

 

A evo šta kaže Urho Kekonen.

 

U knjizi Finland's Man: Urho Kekkonen's Life, 2000. od Peke Hajvarinena nalazi se i dio iz intervjua Kekonena iz 1963.

Novinar ga je pitao kako on sada gleda na Zimski rat, Kekonen je odgovorio otprilike ovako:

”Evo sada više od 20 g. kasnije, kada razmišljate o poziciji SSSR-a u to vrijeme, onda vama brige koje njegovo rukovodstvo tada imalo u vezi bezbjednosti postaju sasvim razumljive”.

Edited October 23, 2014 by apostata

[čekmeže]

Sad mi je lakše kad znam da je prvo svirao 1 orkestar pa onda drugi, nisu zajedno svirali. A što su se Nemci povukli iz Bresta?

[bigvlada]

Jel' rasprava stigla do pomorskih ugovora iz tridesetih, prodaje teških krstarica i keš end kerija? :)  Ako nije, da sačekam. 

 

Samo forum? Forum? Pa ovo je najgore unizavanje ikada. :)

 

Sto se ove godine izmedju tice, ta moralna argumentacija upravo i poredi Hitlera i Staljina, tj. ako je Poljska mogla sa Hitlerom 1934. zasto ne i Staljin 1939. Poredjenje sa Vajmarskom Nemackom nema tu mnogo smisla. No, mala razlika je tu sto je Hindenburg bio jos uvek ziv a nacisti 34' i 39' su dve razlicite stvari po ucinku.

Meni je taj realpoliticki argument za pre svega defanzivan pakt sa nacistima problematican iz tri glavna razloga:

- doturili su vaznu ekonomsku pomoc u resursima kad je nacistima bilo najpotrebnije usled napada na Francusku i Britaniju

- nisu ocekivali napad pa je svo to "defanzivno" zauzimanje istocne Poljske ionako zavrsilo sa nacistima pred Ljeningradom i Moskvom

- zasto su gubili energiju na zauzimanje Baltika i posebno delova Finske sto je zbog slabosti dokazalo Hitleru da vredi napasti sto pre

Dakle, ako je to bila realpolitika, onda je totalno promasena.

 

 

Lepo, a ja sam proveo dugo vremena i jos provodim tako da te mogu uputiti samo na prethodni post.

Da li ces ti, anonimus sa neta, meni nesto verovati ili ne mi je u potpunosti svejedno.

 

Ne da su očekivali napad nego su pripremali sopstvenu ofanzivu. Nemačka je bila brža. Poljaci i Baltik su tu bili kolateralna šteta, kao i Belgija u WW1. Parade, Hitlerova ulica i hotel Ribentrop su tu služili za zamajavanje svetske javnosti da je sve u redu u međusobnim odnosima. Kasnije su došli lažni tenkovi, lažni avioni a u slučaju Britanije i lažni bojni brodovi.

 

U ratu je istina tako dragocena da uvek mora da je prati telesna straža laži. Problem sa delom današnjih istoričara i intelektualaca je taj što ih telesna straža uvošti pre nego što mogu da dopru do istine. 

[Yoda]

Pre bilo kakve ozbiljnije diskusije moramo da razjasnimo ovo tvoje konstantno spominjanje ideoloske duoptrije koje vredja zdrav razum jer znas bolje. Na naucnom polju medjunarodnih odnosa, postoje razlicite ideoloske skole/teorije koje pokusavaju da objasne realnost i istoriju tih odnosa.

Jedna sira grupa tih teorija su one liberalne (utopizam, idealizam, Vilson, neoliberalizam, internacionalni institucionalizam, itd.) koje se sluze uglavnom moralnim argumentima i gde je spoljna politika definisana delimicno unutrasnjom. Na drugoj strani je jos starija i uticajnija grupa teorija zvana realizam (Makijaveli, power politics, neo-realizam, itd.) koja takodje ima svoje ideoloske premise (cesto suprotne od liberalnih) poput onih koje si upravo demonstrirao na ovom topiku - drzave deluju da bi prezivele, spoljna politika nije nuzno definisana unutrasnjom, itd. Postoje i druge skole poput marksisticke, pa strukturalizam, itd., ali ove dve grupe teorija su glavne.

 

Prema tome, ovo tvoje nadmeno podmetanje nekakve ideoloske duoptrije smara jer su gotovo sve (naucne) argumentacije medjunarodnih odnosa ukljucujuci i tvoju (neo)realisticnu itekako ideoloske. To je vazno jer te ideologije i teorije pokusavaju da budu konzistentne u svojoj argumentaciji ne samo oko pojedinih dogadjaja i primera nego uopste. Iz tog razloga ja uopste nemam neki veliki problem ako ti tvrdis da je napad SSSR-a na Poljsku bio defanzivan jer je to tipicna pozicija realista (dakle, Cercila) i dok se drzis te argumentacije i oko ostalih dogadjaja u to vreme, na ovom topiku i sire, to je sasvim OK. Rodzer je verovatno najkonzistentniji forumas u tom pogledu. 

 

No, ono sto meni najvise smeta na ovom topiku je propaganda. Koja je razlika izmedju propagande i ovog gore ideoloskog argumentovanja? Propaganda se lako raspoznaje po mesanju racionalnih argumenata iz suprotnih ideoloskih skola da bi se navijalo za jednu stranu. Da bi to uspelo, potrebno je naravno sistematski precutati druge argumente iz tih teorija koji se ne slazu sa tom propagandom i cine je besmislenom - dakle, potrebno je sluziti se poluistinama.

 

Apostata je to efektno demonstrirao na ovom topiku: spomenuo je pakt Poljske i nacista 1934. (sto bi bio klasicni liberalni/moralni argument protiv Poljske), precutao pakt Poljske i SSSR-a iz 1932. jer se on ne slaze sa ovim prvim (ova dva pakta zajedno su primer skole realizma) i uopste nastavlja pricu o Poljskoj koja nije "cvecka" (opet moralni argument) da bi ustvari odbranio svoj i tvoj klasican realizam (koji ne mari toliko za moralna objasnjenja) oko defanzivne okupacije i aneksije istocne Poljske. Sve to zajedno je puno protivrecnosti, nekonzistentno je, vredja zdrav razum i unizava dobru diskusiju. 

 

I ovo je naravno siri manir samo sto to ljudi izgleda na primecuju - na ovom topiku (i drugim) se koristi realisticna/power politics argumentacija kada se prica o Rusiji/Putinu, dok se moralni argumenti koriste za EU ili Ukrajinu. Za Kosovo se isto tako argumentuje moralno dok je power politics rezervisan za Gruziju, itd. Cenim da je taj manir nekako postao deo drustvene dinamike jer kao drustvo smo bili konstatno izlozeni ovom propagandnom fenomenu.

 

Andurile, ovo sa istorijskim skolama je pogresna lopta za igru, nadam se da si se samo prosto preigrao. Stvari su daleko jednostavnije, da se podsetimo:

 

Zatim, u tom problematicnom kontekstu, ti jos dodajes komentar da je btw. Poljska i naravno Britanija kriva sto Hitler nije razbuzan jos 1935. Sto nisu ranije kolaborirali sa Staljinom - zaista neobjasnjivo, posle svog revolucionarnog terora, milionskih zrtvi, sirenja KP celija po Evropi i u vreme kad je poceo masovno da ubija cak i svoje tokom Velike cistke od 1934.

 

 

 

 

Oko konkretnih stvari: zanimljivo da je baš u to vreme koje pominješ SSSR primljen u Društvo naroda. Hoću da ti kažem da unutrašnja politika Staljina ima vrlo malo veze sa spoljnopolitičkim interesima evropskih sila pobednica, kao i samog SSSR. Takodje, britanska politika u drugoj polovini tridesetih je doživela strašan neuspeh, jer se prekalkulisala u održanju nove evropske ravnoteže koja neće smetati Albionu da jača svoje ekonomske i trgovačke pozicije. Uostalom, Čerčil je već sa pojavom Hitlera na vlasti ukazivao šta će da se desi u poslednjem činu te drame, ali je trebalo da isti napadne Poljsku da bi se dozvali pameti. O ovome može da se diskutuje na istoriji, ali sigurno nećemo da dozvolimo ad hominem diskvalifikacije, omalovažavanje sagovornika i učitavanje. Pa ti izaberi.

 

 

 

3. Takticke diplomatske igre tridesetih nemaju apsolutno nikakve veze i nisu nikakvo opravdanje za ono sto se dogodilo 1939. Oko tih igri i motiva (posebno SSSR-a) se mogu voditi diskusije posto neke arhive u Moskvi jos uvek nisu otvorene. Ali, oko same cinjenice da je Poljska bila zrtva dve susedne totalitarne sile, mejnstrim istorija ne polemise previse. Vec sam rekao gde i ko tako uglavnom polemise.

 

 

3. Ne znam šta da ti kažem već da si u grdnoj zabludi ili ne razumeš najbolje o čemu se tu radi. Spoljna politika je brutalno interesna stvar i sagledavanje iste kroz najmanju ideološku dioptriju™ te očas posla odvede na pogrešan kolosek. Nešto sam skeptičan da će tu bilo kakve ruske arhive ili podaci da pomognu (uostalom, fascinacija nekim novim podatkom ne znači i menjanje fundamentalnih istorijskih sudova).  Ma koliko tebi sovjetska pozicija tada delovala osvajačka ona je pre svega preventivna i defanzivna, jer od Anšlusa i raspada Čehoslovačke (a ko je to pustio da se desi) pitanje državnog suvereniteta postaje igračka u odmeravanju velikih sila. Da su Britanci i Francuzi uspeli do leta 1939. da u defanzivni savez uključe baltičke zemlje i Finsku (pored Poljske i Rumunije), Staljin bi bio priličan bolid da se odluči na pakt sa Hitlerom (a to je bio jezivo hladan i proračunat mozak). Zapravo, podela Poljske dovodi do približavanja zapadnih saveznica i SSSR, onda su u Londonu počeli sve jače da se čuju glasovi kako su Sovjeti uzeli samo ono što su Poljaci mimo odluka Versaja uzeli i da se s njima mora računati u borbi sa Hitlerom. Pitaj čika Vinstona.

 

Dakle, ovde je u pitanju tvoj ideoloski stav, koji ne moze da se sakrije ispod bilo koje "skole". Tvoje objasnjenje da kolaboracije(?!) sa Staljinom 1935. nije moglo da bude zbog terora, zrtvi, izvoza komunizma, velike cistke itd i stav da je Staljin imao neki mracan tajni plan da pregazi Poljake (a o cemu ce nam svedociti neotvoreni arhivi) i da sve ono sto je bilo na medjunarodnoj sceni tridesetih nema "apsolutno nikakve veze" sa 1939. je jedan zanimljiv paraistorijski amalgam koji se sudara sa ogromnom dostupnom gradjom.

 

Sovjetska spoljna politika nakon WW1 ima dva glavna toka:

 

1. Antiimperijalizam uperen ka pobednicama u WWW1, rusenje Versaja i u tom smislu pravljenje taktickih saveza sa svima koji su protiv istog, kao i snazno delovanje preko Kominterne. Staljin u tom smislu ne menja strateski kurs Lenjina, vec ga samo opreznije i pragmaticnije prilagodjava stanju u svetu.

2. Prekret nastaje velikim usponom i  dolaskom Hitlera 1932/33, koji snazno ubrzava francusko-sovjetske odnose sto je obelezeno potpisivanjem  niza bilateralnih ekonomskih, vojnih i politickih ugovora. SSSR 1934. ulazi u Drustvo naroda cime Staljin zapocinje tzv. Narodnofrontovsku politiku koja ima za cilj saradnju sa antinacizmom i antifasizmom na Zapadu, sto je lepo i detaljno objasnjeno na 7. kongresu Kominterne 1935. godine. U vreme ulaska u Drustvo naroda SAD uspostavljaju diplomatske odnose sa SSSR i sluzbeno ga priznaju. Kruna svega je pakt sa Francuskom i Cehoslovackom koji pored ranije navedenog  nije zaziveo i zbog dubokih podela unutar francuskih partija.

 

Poljska nakon WW1 i dosta teskog rata sa Crvenom Armijom iz kojeg je izasla kao pobednik pokusava da vodi balansiranu politiku izmedju Nemacke i SSSR, trazeci mogucnost da se sporazume sa obe zemlje. Sporazum sa SSSR 1932. bio je samo poslednja faza visegodisnjih pregovora. Medjutim Poljaci su, poput Male Antante  bili razocarani stavom Francuske, pa i Britanije 1933. koje su bile spremne da prihvate Musolinijev plav o Paktu cetvorice (Fr, VB, Ita, Nem) koji je zapravo trebalo da arbitrira oko eventualne promene mape Evrope. Zato se 1934. Poljaci odlucuju na pakt sa Hitlerom cime su zeleli da Nemci priznaju njihove granice, a Hitleru je ovaj ugovor bio potreban kao njegov prvi spoljnopoliticki uspeh, za koji kasnije nije mnogo mario. Poljaci su mislili da su se bilateralnim sporazumima sa velikim silama potpuno obezbedili i uopste ih nije interesovalo globalno zaostravanje odnosa. Njihov stav se podudarao sa politikom vlade VB, gde su konzervativci tolerisali Hitlera smatrajuci da ce balansiranjem sa istim da odrze evropsku ravnotezu u sopstvenu korist plus ce podalje da drze SSSR. Cena tog balansiranja bila je prilicno ozbiljna - Hitler je vratio neke oblasti, neke remilitarizovao, pa se naoruzavao, sklapao pomorske ugovore sa VB, zestoko pomagao Franka, da bi na kraju uz saglasnost Fra i VB izvrsio Anslus i raskomadao Cehoslovacku. Minhenski sporazum o Sudetima iz 1938. je odigrao kljucnu ulogu da Staljin zauzme vrlo rezervisan odnos prema Francuskoj i ukljuci u igru Hitlera zarad iskljucivo svojih iinteresa. Nismo li nesto slicno  videli na primeru Poljske iz 1932/1934?

 

Jos jednom, Poljaci su mogl da izbegnu sudbinu da su pristali na predlog sovjetskog pakta iz 1939. na  koji su vec nacelno pristali Pariz i London i koji bi obuhvatio ogroman prostor od Finske do Crnog mora, kao i Belgiju. Ali, Poljska nije zelela da bude tranzitna zemlja za sovjetske vojnike prema nemackom frontu. Bez obzira na rat sa Nemackom koji joj je visio nad glavom cim je Hitler pojeo Sudete,  i sami Poljaci pridruzuju se istom uzimajuci Tjesin i vatreno zagovarajuci zajednicku madjarsko-poljsku granicu. A onda je djavo dosao po svoje.

 

Gledajuci izdvojeno pakt Ribentrop-Molotov, Poljska ispada zrtva totalitaristickih sila, ali kad se malo bolje zagrebe po povrsini onda se vidi da je sama prilicno kumovala svojoj sudbini spoljnopolitickim glupostima. Njihov ekskluzivni nacionalizam na unutrasnjem planu u to vreme ostavicemo za neku drugu temu.

Edited October 24, 2014 by Yoda

[MancMellow]

 

 

Poljaci su mislili da su se bilateralnim sporazumima sa velikim silama potpuno obezbedili i uopste ih nije interesovalo globalno zaostravanje odnosa. 

 

^_^

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The Luftwaffe Seenotdienst: The First Air Rescue Units

 

Cover of a German history book on the Seenotdienst.


Since the beginnings of military aviation air rescue operations had taken place, but the operations were quite ad hoc and improvised in most situations. That would change with the rise of the Luftwaffe which would be publicly acknowledged for the first time by Hermann Goering in 1935. As the Luftwaffe needed to expand rapidly as part of Germany's expansionist aims, the air arm could ill afford the loss of a highly trained pilot or flight crew member. Given that most of the Luftwaffe's taskings were in support of the Wehrmacht, it was expected that most crewmen would bail out over land. Despite this, the Luftwaffe did have a small number of seaplanes at bases in Baltic Sea and North Sea, both of which complicated the bail out from an aircraft in trouble. In 1935, Lt. Colonel Konrad Goltz, a supply officer based in Kiel, was tasked with organizing a system for recovering downed aircrew from the inhospitable waters of the surrounding seas. His initial command consisted of a flotilla of second-hand, if not run-down, boats with local commanders given authority to seek assistance from Kriegsmarine aircraft and local German lifeboat rescue societies. By the following year his units were designated the Ships and Boats Group- an unusual situation of a Luftwaffe officer commanding a fleet of ships!

By 1938 it was apparent to Luftwaffe planners that war with Great Britain was on the horizon and that Luftwaffe crews would be routinely traversing the English Channel and North Sea to strike British targets. In the following year the Ships and Boats Group acquired twelve old Heinkel He 59 float planes which were painted white with Red Cross markings. The aircraft were modified with a floor hatch and extendable ladders as well as a hoist to help lift injured crews into the aircraft. Medical gear, respirators and electrically-heated sleeping bags were also fitted to the old biplane aircraft. Renamed the Seenotdienst (Air-Sea Rescue Service), the Heinkels went into action on 18 December 1939 not to rescue Luftwaffe crews, but downed RAF crews from a Vickers Wellington force that was badly mauled after a bombing attack on the port of Wilhemshaven.

 

The Seenotdienst's first aircraft, the Heinkel He 59.

As the Reich conquered the Low Countries and Denmark and Norway, Seenodienst units were established in those countries for the rescue of downed aircrews. With the fall of France in 1940, captured French aircraft were added to the Seenotdienst fleet along with larger and more capable Dornier Do 24 flying boats. With the massing of Luftwaffe units in France for the anticipated invasion of Britain, German fighter ace and commander Adolf Galland stressed the importance of water survival to his flight crews- even single seat fighters were equipped with a survival raft and Luftwaffe crews were trained to ditch their aircraft and use the rafts as opposed to RAF crews who were trained to bail out and rely on their life vests. In addition, Luftwaffe general Ernst Udet had a series of rescue buoys placed throughout the English Channel- the buoys could hold four men and were stocked with blankets, dry clothes, food, water, and flares. Painted bright yellow and nicknamed "Lobster Pots" by the RAF, through the Battle of Britain both British and German patrol boats would check on the buoys and unusually, kept them stocked as they knew the buoys could save any downed aircrew regardless if they were British or German. The Luftwaffe also pioneered the use of fluorescein green dye to stain the waters around downed aircrew so as to make their positions more visible to rescue aircraft. The Luftwaffe Seenotdienst also pioneered the idea of a rescue task force with Messerschmitt Bf 110 twin engine fighters assigned the task of escorting and protecting the Seenotdienst aircraft.

Between February and August of 1941, of the over 1200 air crews from both sides that went down in the North Sea and English Channel, 444 of them were saved by the Seenotdienst. Of those 444, 78 were RAF crews. With painful awareness that British efforts were severely lacking in air-sea rescue during the Battle of Britain, in 1941 the RAF Coastal Command set about improving its air rescue capability and would use the Seenotdienst as a model. With the expansion of the US Army Air Forces in Britain, the RAF Coastal Command in turn assisted the United States in developing its air sea rescue capabilities.

Source: Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia by Earl H. Tilford, Jr. Center for Air Force History, 1992, p3-6.

 

http://aviationtrivia.blogspot.com/2012/06/luftwaffe-seenotdienst-first-air-rescue.html

 

Koristili su i Heinkel He 115 i Doriner Do 24 između ostalih. 

 

He 115

 

 

Do 24

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For a six-week period in the summer of 1945 as fighting raged between American and Japanese forces on the island of Luzon in the Philippines, six helicopter pilots flew the first rotary-wing medical evacuations under enemy fire in history. Although the helicopter had been used in combat in the Burmese theater of operations in April 1944, the Luzon airlift was first to take place under enemy fire. And here's the really crazy part of the story- the six American pilots were there not for medevac flights, but for repair and supply work! Project Ivory Soap began as concept to use Army-owned supply ships as floating repair depots that could move with the US forces during the Pacific island-hopping campaign. Early in the campaign, it could take weeks, even months, for replacement parts to arrive at front-line units from the United States. Under Project Ivory Soap, USAAF aircraft could be turned around more quickly with the floating depot ships nearby. By December 1943, the program had evolved into using six Liberty ships and eighteen smaller vessels. The ships had helipads constructed on them so that Sikorsky R-4s could shuttle between the ships and airfields ashore with critical parts.

In June 1945 the campaign to liberate the Philippines from Japanese occupation was underway and three of the Liberty ships were deployed to Luzon with the Fifth Air Force while the other three Liberty ships were deployed to the Marianas to support B-29 Superfortress operations with the Twentieth Air Force. On 15 June, R-4 pilot Louis Carle received a request to pick up two soldiers with head injuries 35 miles east of Manila. With only 25 hours of helicopter time and no medical training, Carle arrived at the designated spot but they couldn't locate the two soldiers needing evacuation. Men at the scene who greeted Carle had him fly out a platoon leader with a hip injury instead but they couldn't fit the stretcher into the R-4. Carle ended up removing the other seat and laying the injured soldier on the floor.

News traveled throughout the area of the successful helicopter evacuation and soon Carle and the other pilots of the repair ships were getting requests for additional medevac flights. Given the primitive state of helicopter technology of the day, the flights into combat zones were grueling and often the six pilots were flying as many as six to seven medevac missions a day. Often the pick up points were near front line areas and the helicopters were attractive targets to Japanese units. Mortar and artillery rounds often impacted near the landing zones as well, and adding to the stresses, the pilots were the only crew aboard and they had to load the injured, make sure they were secured, and then fly their flimsy machines out of the combat zone to a field hospital near Manila. As the American forces pushed into the highlands of Luzon, performance of the R-4 and later R-6 helicopters suffered and often Carle and his men had to overspeed the piston engines to get enough rotor lift to get airborne, all while avoiding enemy gunfire.

Carle and another pilot survived crashes of their respective R-4s after ten days. Both men were escorted out of the jungle highlands by appreciative Army units. With his repair ship heading to Okinawa to support the combat effort there, Carle would be officially credited with 12 saved soldiers though the actual numbers were likely quite higher. To replace the departing ship, another repair depot anchored in Manila Bay on 25 June and the four pilots aboard managed to medevac 40 injured soldiers in just four days. To make the medevac flights more comfortable for the wounded soldiers, the helicopter mechanics welded Stokes litters (steel tube and wire mesh baskets for carrying wounded) to the steel frames of the R-4 helicopters.

Of all the injured servicemen flown out of harm's way by helicopter in the Pacific Theater, 60 percent of those medevac flights took place on Luzon in that six week period. One-hundred fifty men are estimated to have been flown out and while this small number is nearly insignificant compared to the 40,000 saved by medevac flights in Korea and 1 million saved in Vietnam, the history making flights of Louis Carle and his fellow pilots in their flimsy Sikorsky R-4s convinced a skeptical military command of the value of the helicopter.


Source: Air & Space Smithsonian, July 2010, Vol. 25, No.2. "Medevac From Luzon" by Roger Connor, p62-67.

http://aviationtrivia.blogspot.com/2010/07/for-six-week-period-in-summer-of-1945.html

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The Coming Kamikaze Threat in World War II We Never Faced

 

The USS Callaghan, the last Allied ship sunk by kamikazes.

As the American fleet began to become proficient at meeting the kamikaze threat during the Second World War, night time was usually a period when sailors got a respite from the waves of suicide attackers- the vast majority of kamikaze attacks that took place were during the daylight hours. At night the fleet could repair damage from the day's attacks, sailors could get some rest, and ammunition and supplies for the next day's battles could be stocked. By the time of the invasion of Okinawa in April 1945, the Japanese were already in full swing preparing the Home Islands for the anticipated Allied invasion. Operation Olympic was the code name for the invasion of the southernmost of the Home Islands, Kyushu, and it was scheduled for November 1945. The size of the invasion fleet would dwarf not only what was used at Okinawa, but it would also dwarf the Allied landings at Normandy on D-Day in 1944. Approximately just over 2,700 ships and landing craft participated at Normandy; the invasion of Kyushu would have required over 4,000 ships. In twelve days, over 300,000 American troops came ashore at Normandy; on the beaches of Kyushu during Operation Olympic, it was planned that the same number of American troops would storm ashore in just the first *three* days. Therefore in Japanese defense planning for the defense of Kyushu, called "Ketsu-Go", kamikazes were a key part of disrupting the Pacific Fleet Amphibious Force/Task Force 51. Little known to most, though, is that the planned kamikaze threat would have been of a level of ferocity and technique not widely faced by the US Navy in the Pacific War.

Through most of the war, the kamikaze threat consisted of primarily front-line aircraft. However, the submarine blockade of Japan made getting strategic materials like the ores used in metal increasingly difficult. Bauxite, for example, is an ore that is the main source of aluminum and the Japanese aircraft industry's main source for bauxite were open pit mines near Singapore. As early as 1943 thoughts began to shift towards the use of wood in new aircraft designs and the Germans had even provided the Japanese with plans for the De Havilland Mosquito, the Royal Air Force's "Wooden Wonder". Mosquito components that had been captured were even shipped to Japan aboard the Imperial Japanese Navy submarine I-29, but it was sunk in July 1944 near Japan. While the Japanese were aware of wood's natural radar defeating properties, any consideration at this point in using wood in aircraft designs was more a practical matter with the ore shortages; any benefits against Allied radars was seen rather remarkably as a secondary and less important benefit.

 

Yokosuka K4Y1, probably the type that sank the Callaghan.

By the time the Battle of Okinawa was winding down, "Ketsu-Go" was in full swing on Kyushu and a key part of the defense was the use of massed kamikaze attacks. But the state of Japanese aircraft industry was in disarray with the B-29 attacks and the ongoing ore shortages. In July 1945 to meet the required numbers of kamikaze aircraft, all of the training units were converted to kamikaze units which added thousands of experienced pilots but over 5,000 antiquated biplane trainers made of wood and fabric. But again, at this point in the war, no one in Japan had realized that an elderly biplane trainer was a lot harder to spot on radar- plans at that point were to offset the slow performance of the biplane aircraft by shifting the kamikaze attacks to the night time, the traditional sanctuary period for the American fleet. However, somewhere in the Japanese command structure connected all the dots- on the night of 28 July 1945, the Fletcher-class destroyer USS Callaghan was on radar picket duty off the coast of Okinawa. In a time before the advent of airborne early warning aircraft, radar picket destroyers patrolled the edges of the fleet to search for inbound kamikazes. On this night, an elderly biplane floatplane, most likely a Yokosuka K4Y1 trainer, was warded off on its first pass, but it came around undetected for a second pass and struck the destroyer, sinking it with the loss of 47 sailors. The following night, another elderly biplane struck another radar picket, the USS Cassin Young- though not sunk, 22 sailors were killed and the ship had to withdraw from action for repairs. A third destroyer, the USS Prichett, was aiding the stricken Callaghan, was very nearly sunk by another elderly biplane on a kamikaze mission.

 

Yokosuka K5Y biplane trainer.

The destroyers had difficulty on downing the attackers for three reasons- it was night, not the usual time kamikazes attacked, secondly, the wood and fabric biplanes were difficult to spot and track on radar, and lastly the wood and fabric construction threw off the proximity fuses of the anti-aircraft guns- the proximity fuse's sensor that triggered the detonation of the round was optimized for metal aircraft; against the old wood and fabric biplanes, the proximity fuzes detonated the round too late, or in some cases, not at all. The action that night against those three radar picket destroyers changed thinking on the role of the 5,000+ elderly biplane aircraft that were going to be used as kamikazes for "Ketsu-Go". Here was an unexpected weapon that could counter the American technological advantages in radar and proximity-fuzed shells fired by anti-aircraft guns. American intelligence analysts had seen the massive change in the air forces of Japan in the summer of 1945 and were well aware of Japanese interests in wood, but it hadn't occurred to the Navy that this was a possibly game-changing combination that would have threatened initial phases of Operation Olympic. It was assumed that fuel shortages would keep most Japanese aircraft grounded and this misconception was reinforced by the increasing lack of air action against the B-29 raids and that US warships even managed to get close enough to the Home Islands to shell coastal targets without getting attacked. In fact, the Japanese had stockpiled fuel just for the use of the kamikazes in "Ketsu-Go".

 

Tachikawa Ki-17 trainer aircraft.

At Okinawa, only one of the US Navy's carrier air wings was trained and equipped for night combat, that being Night Air Group 90 embarked aboard the USS Enterprise. By November 1945, only one additional night air group would be available for Operation Olympic, giving only 50 aircraft to defend the invasion fleet at night against well over 5,000 night kamikazes that would have been difficult to spot on radar, using the mountainous terrain of Kyushu to mask their approaches to the invasion fleet, and be of a construction that would probably render a large portion of the proximity-fuzed shells ineffective.

It is perhaps a blessing that the Japanese surrender following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki took place. The kamikaze plans for "Ketsu-Go" alone would have well resulted in significant casualties on the shores of Kyushu, but instead history is left with the USS Callaghan as the last Allied ship to be sunk by kamikazes- and that night on 28 July was a small preview of the storm facing the US fleet in the waters of the Home Islands.

Source: Hell to Pay- Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947 by D.M. Giangreco. Naval Institute Press, 2009, p125-137. Photos: Wikipedia.

http://aviationtrivia.blogspot.com/2012/08/the-coming-kamikaze-threat-in-world-war.html

 

Ukratko, planirali su napade sa 5000+ drvenih aviona na savezničke brodove noću. Ne bi izmenili tok rata ali bi gubici na suprotnoj strani bili značajni. 

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Two Paperclips and an Eraser Contribute to Victory in WW2


The first variants of the Navy's premier carrier-borne fighter of the first half of the Second World War, the Grumman F4F Wildcat, were hampered by one weakness even before they took off from their aircraft carriers- lacking a folding wing, the first versions of the Wildcat took up quite a bit of space on the carrier and, by extension, that limited the number of Wildcats that could carried aboard. Given combat losses that would inevitably occur, having as many aircraft on the carrier as possible conferred tactical advantages in battle. The current production version of the Wildcat at the time was the F4F-3.


The most obvious answer would be hinge the wings' outer sections and folding them upward as was done on most carrier aircraft (even to this day). However, to Leroy Grumman and his engineering team, that wasn't an optimal answer as that increased the height of the stowed aircraft- if the wing could be folded in a way that didn't increase the height of the aircraft, then extra aircraft could be winched up and stowed up near the ceiling of the hangar deck. Grumman reasoned that the optimum geometry would be to somehow fold the wing back not unlike the way a bird folded its wings back along its body. Grumman drew upon his engineering intuition and reasoned that the wing had to rotate about a pivot point. He took a draftsman's eraser and two paperclips; he bent one end of the paperclips and began to stick them into the eraser. The eraser was the body of the Wildcat and the paperclips were the wings. By trying different angles, Grumman managed to figure out the angle needed to that when the clip was rotated, it folded back flat against the eraser. This was known in engineering parlance as a skewed axis.

In the Wildcat, this axis was a pivot set into the wing root that pointed outward and backward at angle into the moving portion of the wing. As the wing rotated about this pivot, it folded back against fuselage, making the F4F a compact package- so compact, that six F4Fs with what Grumman called the "Sto-Wing" could fit into a deck or hangar space normally occupied by two F4Fs that had nonfolding wings. At first it was planned to use hydraulics to fold the wings, but it was found this added excessive weight, so the wings would have to be folded manually by the deck crew. A large master pin would lock the wing in position either extended or folded.



The Sto-Wing was immediately placed into the production line- with the current Wildcat model being the F4F-3, those with the Sto-Wing became the F4F-4. From a tactical standpoint, an aircraft carrier could now carry twice as many F4Fs as before with the wingspan of the Wildcat going from 39 feet to just over 14 feet folded. Deck handling improved as it was easier to move an F4F with the wings folded on a crowded flight deck or in a packed hangar deck. The Sto-Wing concept was applied as well to the TBF Avenger and the F4F Wildcat's successor, the F6F Hellcat. And it's seen today on carrier decks with the Northrop Grumman E-2 Hawkeye- since the E-2 had the dish-like radome above the fusleage, the wings couldn't be folded up and over each other as was done on other long-span carrier aircraft like the Lockheed S-2 Viking. So E-2 Hawkeye's wings use the Grumman Sto-Wing principle to fold back towards the tail.

Source: The Grumman Story by Richard Thruelsen. Praeger Publishers, 1976, p124-125.

http://aviationtrivia.blogspot.com/2010/10/two-paperclips-and-eraser-contribute-to.html

[Takeshi]

gardijan opsirnije o posleratnoj odbrani od komunizma u grckoj. i posledicama koje se vide danas.

 

Athens 1944: Britain’s dirty secret

 

When 28 civilians were killed in Athens, it wasn’t the Nazis who were to blame, it was the British. Ed Vulliamy and Helena Smith reveal how Churchill’s shameful decision to turn on the partisans who had fought on our side in the war sowed the seeds for the rise of the far right in Greece today.

 

Timeline: the battle between left and right

Late summer 1944 German forces withdraw from most of Greece, which is taken over by local partisans. Most of them are members of ELAS, the armed wing of the Communist KKE party

October 1944 Allied forces, led by General Ronald Scobie, enter Athens, the last German-occupied area, on 13 October. Georgios Papandreou returns from exile with the Greek government

2 December 1944 Rather than integrate ELAS into the new army, Papandreou and Scobie demand the disarmament of all guerrilla forces. Six members of the new cabinet resign in protest

3 December 1944 Violence in Athens after 200,000 march against the demands. More than 28 are killed and hundreds are injured. The 37-day Dekemvrianá begins. Martial law is declared on 5 December

January/February 1945 Gen Scobie agrees to a ceasefire in exchange for ELAS withdrawal. In February the Treaty of Varkiza is signed by all parties. ELAS troops leave Athens with 15,000 prisoners

1945/46 Right-wing gangs kill more than 1,100 civilians, triggering civil war when government forces start battling the new Democratic Army of Greece (DSE), mainly former ELAS soldiers

1948-49 DSE suffers a catastrophic defeat in the summer of 1948, with nearly 20,000 killed. In July 1949 Tito closes the Yugoslav border, denying DSE shelter. Ceasefire signed on 16 October 1949

21 April 1967 Right-wing forces seize power in a coup d’état. The junta lasts until 1974. Only in 1982 are communist veterans who had fled overseas allowed to return to Greece

 

 

Edited November 30, 2014 by Takeshi

[Dagmar]

Ipak, verovatno su im učinili uslugu.

[Takeshi]

Ipak, verovatno su im učinili uslugu.

 

vojna uprava je bolja od socijalizma? 

 

malo bi posleratna evropa drugacije izgledala sa npr. grckom, italijom i spanijom sa levicarskim vladama (gde su pokreti otpora uglavnom bili takvi).

ali, to vec spada u sta-bi-bilo-kad-bi-bilo price.